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Abstract
We study the Sign then Encrypt, Commit then Encrypt and Sign, and
Encrypt then Sign paradigms in the context of two cryptographic primi-
tives, namely designated confirmer signatures and signcryption. Our study
identifies weaknesses in those paradigms which impose the use of expen-
sive encryption (as a building block) in order to meet a reasonable security
level. Next, we propose some optimizations which annihilate the found
weaknesses and allow consequently cheap encryption without compro-
mising the overall security. Our optimizations further enjoy verifiability, a
property profoundly needed in many real-life applications of the studied
primitives.
Keywords: Sign then Encrypt, Commit then Encrypt and Sign, En-
crypt then Sign, (Public) Verifiability, Designated confirmer signatures,
Signcryption, Privacy-preserving mechanisms, Zero knowledge proofs
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic mechanisms that require both the functionalities of signature
and of encryption are becoming nowadays increasingly important. In fact,
signatures guarantee the integrity/authenticity of the transmitted data, whereas
encryption is needed to ensure either the confidentiality of the signed data or
the opacity of the signature. In this document, we study two of these primitives,
namely designated confirmer signatures and signcryption.
Designated confirmer signatures An important feature in digital signatures
is the universal verification, i.e. anyone can verify signatures issued by a signer
given his public key. However, such a property can be undesirable in some
applications and needs to be controlled or limited. A typical example is a soft-
ware vendor willing to embed signatures in his products such that only paying
customers are entitled to check the authenticity of these signatures. Undeniable
signatures, introduced in [25], provide a good solution to this problem as they
are: (1) only verifiedwith the help of the signer, (2) non transferable, (3) binding
in the sense that a signer cannot deny a signature he has actually issued. The
only drawback of these signatures is that unavailability of the signer obstructs
the entire verification process. To overcome this problem, designated confirmer
signatureswere introduced in [24], where the confirmation/denial of a signature
is delegated to a designated confirmer. With this solution, the signer can confirm
only signatures he has just generated, whilst the confirmer can confirm/deny
any signature. Finally, a desirable property in designated confirmer signatures
is the convertibility of the signatures to ordinary ones. Indeed, such a property
turned out to play a central role in fair payment protocols [15].
Signcryption This primitive was introduced by Zheng [96] to simultaneously
perform the functions of both signature and encryption in a way that is more
efficient than signing and encrypting separately. A typical use-case of this
mechanism is secure email where the sender wants to encrypt his email to
guarantee privacy, and at the same time, the receiver needs to ensure that the
encrypted email comes from the entity that claims to be its provenance. A
further requirement on signcryption is verifiability which consists in the possi-
bility to prove efficiently the validity of a given signcryption, or to prove that a
signcryption has indeed been produced on a given message. In fact, verifiabil-
ity is applicable in filtering out spams in a secure email system; the spam filter
should be able to verify the authenticity of the ciphertext without knowing the
message. Also, the receiver that decrypts the email might be compelled, for
instance to resolve some later disputes, to prove that some sender has (not)
produced the email; therefore, it would be desirable to support the prover with
efficient means to provide such proofs without having to disclose his private
input. Although a number of constructions [3, 88, 29, 68, 86] have tackled the
notion of verifiability (this notion is often referred to in the literature as pub-
lic verifiability, and it denotes the possibility to release (by the receiver) some
information which allows to publicly verify a signcryption with/out revealing
the message in question), most of these schemes do not allow the sender to
prove the validity of the created signcryption, nor allow the receiver to prove
without revealing any information, ensuring consequently non-transferability, to a
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third party, the (in)validity of a signcryption w.r.t. a given message. It is worth
noting that the former need, i.e. allowing the sender to prove the validity of
a signcryption without revealing the message, solves completely the spam fil-
tering problem without having the receiver disclose anything; a sender needs
only to provide a proof of validity of his signcrypted email to ensure that the
latter will be marked as a legitimate email. The proof should be ideally “non
transferable” so that the spam filter cannot replicate it to a third party, ensuring
therefore the privacy of the sender.
1.1 Related work
Since the introduction of the aforementioned primitives, many realizations (of
these primitives) which achieve different levels of security have been proposed.
On a high level, security in these primitives involves basically two properties;
privacy and unforgeability. The last property is analogous to unforgeability in
digital signatures and it denotes the difficulty to impersonate the signer. Pri-
vacy in confirmer signatures (signcryptions) is similar to indistinguishability
in public key encryption, and it refers to the difficulty to distinguish con-
firmer signatures (signcryptions) based on the underlying messages. Defining
formally those two properties is a fundamental divergence in constructions
realizing these primitives as there are many issues which come into play. One
consequential difference between security models is whether the adversary is
external or internal to the system. The former case corresponds to outsider se-
curity, e.g. [37], whereas the latter denotes insider security which protects the
system protagonists even when some of their fellows are malicious or have
compromised/lost their private keys [20, 49, 91, 1, 69]. It is naturally possible to
mix these notions into one single scheme, i.e. insider privacy and outsider un-
forgeability [1, 27], or outsider privacy and insider unforgeability [2]. However,
the most frequent mix is the latter as illustrated by the number of works in the
literature, e.g. [1, 62, 2]; it is also justified by the necessity to protect the signer
fromanyone trying to impersonate him including entities in the system. Insider
privacy is by contrast needed in very limited applications; the typical example,
given in [1], is when the adversary happens to steal the private key of the signer,
but we still wish to protect the privacy of the recorded signcryptions/confirmer
signatures sent by the genuine signer.
Building complicated systems upon simple and basic primitives is custom-
ary in cryptography as it allows to re-use existing work about the primitives,
and it achieves easy-to-understand and easy-to-prove systems. The classical
constructions used to build the above mentioned primitives are:
Sign then Encrypt (StE) For confirmer signatures, this technique consists in
first signing the message, then encrypting the produced signature. The con-
struction was first formally 1 described in [20], and it suffered the resort to
concurrent zero knowledge (ZK) protocols of general NP statements in the
confirmation/denial protocol (i.e. proving knowledge of the decryption of a
ciphertext, and that this decryption forms a valid signature on the given mes-
sage). Later, the proposal in [55] circumvented this problem by encrypting
1The idea without proof was already known, for instance, it was mentioned in [34].
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the digital signature during the confirmation protocol. With this trick, the au-
thors managed to get rid of concurrent ZK proofs of general NP statements
in the confirmation protocol (the denial protocol still suffers the recourse to
such proofs), but at the expense of the security and the length of the resulting
signatures. Another construction implementing this principle is given in [93];
it uses cryptosystems with labels and is analyzed in a more elaborate security
model. However, it is supplied with only one efficient instantiation as the con-
firmation/denial protocols still resort to concurrent ZK protocols of general NP
statements.
For signcryption, this technique consists in similarly signing the message
to be signcrypted, however the signcryption corresponds to the encryption
of the produced digital signature in addition to the message. The construction
was first described and analyzed in [1]. It was further extended in [69] to
support the multi-user setting, i.e. a setting where many senders interact
with many receivers, using tag-based encryption. Finally, there are the recent
constructions [27] which achieve multi-user insider security using (tag-based)
encryption schemes from the hybrid encryption paradigm. It is worth noting
that none of these constructions treat verifiability.
Commit then Encrypt and Sign (CtEaS) This technique was first described
in the context of signcryption in [1]. It has been essentially introduced to
parallel encryption and signature. In fact, signcryption of a message using
this technique is obtained by committing to the message, then encrypting the
message and the randomness used to form the commitment, and signing the
commitment. Later, (a variant of) this technique was adopted in [49] for con-
firmer signatures, i.e. encryption is performed only on the randomness used
to form the commitment, and signature is obtained on this encryption in addi-
tion to the commitment. This construction was identified to be flawed in [91],
where the authors propose to use encryption with labels as building blocks in
order to repair the flaw. More precisely, a confirmer signature on a message
m is obtained by first committing to m, then encrypting the randomness used
in the commitment w.r.t. the label m‖pk, pk being the public key of the used
signature scheme, and finally signing the commitment. Although CtEaS can
be used with any signature scheme (StE needs to be used with special signa-
ture schemes in order to allow an efficient verifiability), it is still afflicted with
the recourse to general ZK proofs, e.g. proving in concurrent ZK the knowl-
edge of the decryption of an IND-CCA encryption that equals a string used
for commitment. An efficient instantiation is however achieved for confirmer
signatures in [91] using Camenisch-Shoup’s verifiable encryption scheme [21]
and Pedersen’s commitment scheme.
Encrypt then Sign (EtS) This technique consists in first encrypting the mes-
sage, then producing a signature on this encryption. EtS has been introduced
for two-user setting signcryption in [1]. It has been later extended in [69]
to support the multi-user setting using tag-based encryption. Besides, in the
same work [69], the authors present variations of the paradigm using symmet-
ric primitives and achieve efficient signcryption schemes but the expense of
security (outsider unforgeability/privacy) and verifiability.
To summarize the state of the art, StE, CtEaS, and EtS have been studied
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for the aforementioned primitives in different security models. These studies
conclude the need for CCA secure encryption in order to ensure insider privacy.
Since outsider security might be all one needs for privacy as quoted by the authors
in [1], we propose to relax the requirement on insider privacy with the hope of
weakening the strong assumption (CCA security) on the encryption. The work
[69] achieves some results in this direction as it rests on CPA secure symmetric
encryption, but at the expense of verifiability.
It would be nice to study these paradigms in the outsider privacy model,
and provide efficient variants which rest on cheap encryption while providing
good verifiability properties. This is the main contribution of this paper.
1.2 Contributions and overview of our techniques
As stated earlier, themain contribution of the present paper is a thorough study
of StE, CtEaS, and EtS in the outsider privacy model. Our study concludes that
both StE and CtEaS require expensive assumptions on the underlying encryp-
tion (PCA security) in order to derive signcryption or confirmer signatureswith
outsider privacy. We do this by first proving the insufficiency of OW-CCA and
NM-CPA secure encryption using the celebrated meta-reduction tool, then by
exhibiting a simple attack if the system is instantiated from certain encryption
schemes. These negative results can be explained by an inherent weakness in
these constructions that consists in the possibility of creating confirmer signa-
tures or signcryption without the help of the signer.
Next, we propose ameliorations of the paradigms that annihilate this weak-
ness without compromising the security. We achieve this by binding the digital
signature to the resulting signcryption/confirmer signature. Consequently, our
optimizations of StE andCtEaS (for both signcryptionand confirmer signatures)
rest on cheap encryption (CPA secure asymmetric encryption) and support ef-
ficiently the verifiability property required for such mechanisms. We actually
describe explicitly, and for the first time, the verifiability proofs in case the
constructions are instantiated from large classes of encryption, commitment,
and signature schemes.
We have further the following side-results:
1. Our negative results for StE serve also for providing evidence that a well
known undeniable signature [34] is unlikely to provide its conjectured
privacy. Moreover, the adjustment we propose to the basic StE paradigm
fixes also this scheme ([34]), and captures further undeniable signatures
that were proposed later [64, 85].
2. We provide practical instantiations of EtS, in the context of both sign-
cryption and confirmer signatures, which efficiently support verifiability.
In fact, some of the required verifiability proofs involve non-interactive
proofs of correctness of a decryption. We identify several encryption
schemes that efficiently implement this feature.
3. Weproposeanewparadigmfor signcryption, Encrypt then Sign then Encrypt,
which allows efficient verifiability while proffering full outsider privacy
(i.e. anonymity of the sender and indistinguishability of the signcryp-
tion).
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4. Finally, our constructions (of both confirmer signatures and signcryp-
tion) can achieve insider privacywhile conserving their good verifiability
properties if we substitute the required “normal” encryption by tag-based
encryption combined with secure one-time signatures.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cryptographic primitives
Notation: Throughout the text, we will use a dot notation to refer the different
components; for instance, Γ.encrypt() refers to the encryption algorithm of
public key encryption scheme Γ, Σ.pk to the public key of signature scheme Σ,
etc.
2.1.1 Digital signatures
A signature scheme comprises three algorithms, namely the key generation
algorithm keygen, the signing algorithm sign, and the verification algorithm
verify. The standard security notion for a signature scheme is existential un-
forgeability under chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA), which was introduced
in [54]. Informally, this notion refers to the hardness of, given a signing ora-
cle, producing a valid pair of message and corresponding signature such that
the message has not been queried to the signing oracle. There exists also the
stronger notion, SEUF-CMA (strong existential unforgeability under chosen
message attack), which allows the adversary to produce a forgery on a pre-
viously queried message, however the corresponding signature must not be
obtained from the signing oracle.
A signature is (t, ǫ, qs)-(S)EUF-CMA secure, if no adversary, operating in time t
and issuing qs queries to the signing oracle, produces a pair of a (new) message
and a valid corresponding signature that was not obtained from the signing
oracle, with probability greater than ǫ; the probability is taken over all the
random coins.
2.1.2 Public key encryption
A public key encryption (PKE) scheme consists of the key generation algo-
rithm keygen, the encryption algorithm encrypt and the decryption algorithm
decrypt. The typical security goals a PKE scheme should attain are: one-
wayness (OW) which corresponds to the difficulty of inverting a ciphertext,
indistinguishability (IND) which refers to the hardness of distinguishing ci-
phertexts based on the messages they encrypt, and finally non-malleability
(NM) which corresponds to the hardness of deriving from a given ciphertext
another ciphertext such that the underlying plaintexts are meaningfully re-
lated. Conversely, the typical attack models an adversary against an encryption
scheme is allowed to are: Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) where the adversary
can encrypt any message of his choice, Plaintext Checking Attack (PCA) in
which the adversary is allowed to query an oracle on pairs (m, c) and gets an-
swerswhether c encryptsm or not, and finally Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA)
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where the adversary is allowed to query a decryption oracle. Pairing the men-
tioned goals with these attack models yields nine security notions: goal-atk for
goal ∈ {OW, IND,NM} and atk ∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA}. We refer to [4] for the formal
definitions of these notions as well as for the relations they satisfy.
Later in the text, we will need further the INV-CPA notion, i.e. invisibility
under a chosen plaintext attack, which denotes the difficulty to distinguish
ciphertexts on an adversarially chosen message from random elements in the
ciphertext space (public-key variant of the INV-OT notion defined later for Data
Encapsulation Mechanisms, i.e. DEMs).
Similarly, an encryption scheme is (t, ǫ, q)-goal-atk secure, if no adversary op-
erating in time t and issuing q queries to the allowed oracles, succeeds in the
game defined by the security notion goal-atk with probability greater than ǫ;
the probability is again over all the random coins.
2.1.3 Key/Data encapsulationmechanisms (KEM/DEMs)
A KEM comprises three algorithms: (1) the key generation algorithm keygen
which probabilistically generates a key pair (sk, pk), (2) the encapsulation algo-
rithm encap which inputs the public key pk and probabilistically generates a
session key denoted k and its encapsulation c, (3) and finally the decapsulation al-
gorithm decapwhich inputs the private key sk and the element c and computes
the decapsulation k of c, or returns ⊥ if c is invalid.
The typical security goals that a KEM should satisfy are similar to those defined
for encryption schemes. Similarly, when conjoinedwith the three attackmodels
CPA, PCA and CCA, they yield nine security notions whose definitions follow
word-for-word from the definitions of the encryption schemes notions.
Let κ be a security parameter. We recall below the formal definition of an
IND-CPA experiment, conducted by an adversary A against a KEM K (K de-
notes the keys space in the experiment below).
Experiment Expind-cpa-b
K ,A
(1κ)
(pk, sk)← K .keygen(1κ),
I ← A(pk)
(c⋆, k⋆)←K .encappk()
if b = 0 then {k R←− K, k⋆ ← k}
d←A(I, c⋆, k⋆)
Return d
A KEM is (t, ǫ)-IND-CPA-secure if the advantage defined by
Advind−cpa
K ,A
(κ) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [Expind−cpa−bK ,A (κ) = b] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
of any adversary A, operating in time t, in the above game, is no greater
than ǫ. The probability is taken over all the random coins.
A DEM is a secret key encryption scheme given by the same algorithms
forming a public key encryption scheme that are: (1) the key generation algo-
rithm keygen which produces uniformly distributed keys k on input a given
security parameter, (2) the encryption algorithm encryptwhich inputs a key k
and a messagem and produces a ciphertext c, and (3) the decryption algorithm
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which decrypts ciphertext c using the same key k (used for encryption) to get
back the message m or the special rejection symbol ⊥.
We define in the following a security notion for DEMs that wewill need later in
the text; it is called invisibility under a one-time attack INV-OT, and it denotes
the difficulty to distinguish the encryption of an adversarially chosen message
from a random ciphertext (C denotes in the experiment below the ciphertext
space).
Experiment Expinv-ot−b
D,A (1
κ)
k←D.keygen(1κ),
(m⋆,I)←A(1κ)
e⋆ ←D.encryptk(m
⋆)
if b = 0 then {e R←− C, e⋆ ← e}
d←A(I, e⋆)
Return d
We define:
Advinv−otD,A (1
κ) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [Expinv−ot−bD,A (1κ) = b] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
A DEM is said to be (t, ǫ)-INV-OT secure if the advantage Advinv−otD,A (κ) of any
adversary A, operating in time t and running the experiment above, is no
greater than ǫ. The probability is taken over all the random coins.
A DEM with injective encryption is a DEM where, for a every fixed key, the
encryption algorithm encrypt, seen a function of the message, is injective. I.e.
for a fixed key, for every message m, there exists only one valid ciphertext that
decrypts to m. Note that such DEMs exist, e.g. the one-time pad, and proffer
interesting security properties, e.g. INV-OT.
Finally, KEMs can be efficiently combined with DEMs to build secure pub-
lic key encryption schemes. This technique is called the hybrid encryption
paradigm andwe refer to [60] for the necessary and sufficient conditions on the
KEMs and the DEMs to obtain a certain security level for the resulting hybrid
encryption scheme.
2.1.4 Commitment schemes
A commitment scheme [16] consists of (1) a key generation algorithm keygen,
(2) a commitment algorithm commit, (3) and an opening algorithm open. We
require in a commitment scheme the hiding and binding properties. The former
informally denotes the difficulty to infer information about the message from
the corresponding commitment, whereas the latter denotes the difficulty to
come up with collisions, i.e. find two different messages that map to the same
value by the commit algorithm. A further property might be required, in some
applications, for commitments, namely injectivity; It denotes that commit for
a fixed message (viewed as a function of the opening value) is injective: two
different opening values lead two different commitments.
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2.2 (Non-) Interactive Proofs
An interactive proof, first introduced in [53], informally consists of a prover P
trying to convince a verifier V that an instance x belongs to a language L. x
refers to the common input whereas (P,V)(x) denotes the proof instance carried
between P andV at the end of whichV is (not) convinced with the membership
of the alleged instance x to L: (P,V)(x) ∈ {Accept,Reject}. P is modeled by a
probabilistic TuringmachinewhereasV ismodeled by a polynomialprobabilistic
Turing machine. During (P,V)(x), the parties exchange a sequence of messages
called the proof transcript.
An interactive proof should satisfy completeness which denotes the property
of successfully running the protocol if both parties are honest. A further prop-
erty required in proof systems is soundness which captures the inability of a
cheating prover P to convince the verifier V with an invalid statement.
(Concurrent) ZK proofs Let (P,V) be an interactive proof system for some
language L. We say that (P,V) is zero knowledge if for every x ∈ L, the proof
transcript (P,V)(x) can be produced by an efficient algorithm S, with no access
to the prover, with indistinguishable probability distributions from the real
interactionwith the genuine prover. A proof is said to provide concurrent ZK if
it remains ZK when the prover interacts concurrently with many verifiers (that
might potentially collude) on many instances of the proof. It was shown in [38]
that every NP language accepts a concurrent ZK proof system.
Proofs of knowledge A proof of knowledge is an interactive proof in which
the prover succeeds ’convincing’ a verifier that he knows something. In addition
to the completenessproperty (i.e. property of successfully running the protocol
if bothparties are honest), a proof of knowledgemust further satisfy thevalidity
or soundness property. I.e. let R be the NP-relation for an NP-language L:
L = {x : ∃ w such that R(x,w) holds}
Validity of a proof of knowledge for R captures the intuition that from any
(possibly cheating) prover P˜ that is able to convince the verifier with good
enough probability on a statement x ∈ L, there exists an efficient knowledge
extractor capable of extracting a valid witness for x from P˜ with non negligible
probability. This guarantees that no prover that doesn’t know the witness can
succeed in convincing the verifier. Finally, zero knowledgeness of a proof of
of knowledge captures the possibility to prove knowledge of the given witness
without revealing it. This property is defined, as in interactive proofs, using an
efficient simulator, with no access to the prover, capable of producing a proof
transcript indistinguishable from the interaction between the genuine prover
and the cheating verifier.
Σ protocols A public-coin protocol is an interactive proof in which the verifier
chooses all its messages randomly from publicly known sets. A three-move
protocol can be written in a canonical form in which the messages exchanged
in the three moves are often called commitment, challenge, and response re-
spectively. The protocol is said to have the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property
(HVZK) if there exists an algorithm that is able, provided the verifier behaves
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as prescribed by the protocol, to produce, without the knowledge of the secret,
transcripts that are indistinguishable from those of the real protocol. The pro-
tocol is said to have the special soundness property (SpS) property if there exists
an algorithm that is able to extract the secret from two accepting transcripts
of the protocol with the same commitment and different challenges. Finally, a
three-move public-coin protocol with HVZK and SpS properties is called a Σ
protocol.
Non-interactive proofs were introduced in [7]. They consist of three entities:
a prover, a verifier, and a uniformly selected common reference string - crs- (which
can be thought of as being selected by a trusted third party). Both verifier and
prover can read the referencestring. The interaction consists of a singlemessage
sent from the prover to the verifier, who is left with the final decision. The zero-
knowledge requirement refers to a simulator that outputs pairs that should be
indistinguishable from the pairs (crs, prover’s message).
2.3 Cryptographic reductions
A reduction in cryptology, often denoted R, is informally an algorithm solving
some problem given access to an adversary A against some cryptosystem.
To be able to use A, the reduction must simulate A’s environment (instance
generation, queries if any...) in away that is (almost) indistinguishable from the
real model. Both the reduction and the adversary are considered probabilistic
Turing machines. The advantage of the reduction adv(R) is by definition the
success probability in solving the given instance of the problem, where the
probability is taken over the instance generation and the random coins of both
R and A. Similarly, the advantage of the adversary A, denoted by adv(A)
refers to the success probability (taken over all the coin tosses) in breaking the
cryptosystem.
Key-preserving reductions These reductions refer to a wide and popular
class of reductions which supply the adversary with the same public key as its
challenge key. In this text, we restrict this notion to a smaller class of reductions.
Definition 2.1 (Key-preserving reductions) LetA be an adversary which solves a
problem A that is perfectly reducible to OW-CPA breaking some public key encryption
scheme Γ. Let further R be a reduction breaking some security notion of Γ w.r.t. a
public key pk given access toA. R is said to be key-preserving if it launchesA over
her own challenge key pk in addition to some other parameters (chosen freely by her)
according to the specification ofA.
Such reductions were for instance used in [78] to prove a separation between
factoring and IND-CCA-breaking some factoring-based encryption schemes in
the standard model.
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3 ConvertibleDesignatedConfirmerSignatures (CDCS)
3.1 Syntax
A convertible designated confirmer signature (CDCS) scheme consists of the
following procedures:
setup(1κ) On input a security parameter κ, probabilistically generate the pub-
lic parameters param of the scheme. Although not always explicitly men-
tioned, param serves as an input to all the algorithms/protocols that follow.
keygenE(1
κ, param) This probabilistic algorithm outputs the key pair (pkE, skE)
for the entity E in the system; E can either be the signer S who issues
the confirmer signatures, or the confirmer C who confirms/denies the
signatures.
signskS (m, pkC) On input skS, pkC and amessagem, this probabilistic algorithm
outputs a confirmer signature µ on m.
verify{coins ∨ skC}(µ,m, pkS, pkC) This is an algorithm, run by the signer on a just
generated signature or by the confirmer on any signature. The input to the
algorithm is: the alleged signature µ, the message m, pkS, pkC, the coins
coins used to produce the signature if the algorithm is run by the signer,
and skC if it is run by the confirmer. The output is either 1 if the signature
if valid, or 0 otherwise.
sconfirm〈S(coinsµ),V〉(µ,m, pkS, pkC) This is an interactiveprotocolwhere the signer
S convinces a verifierV of the validity of a signature he has just generated.
The common input comprises the signature and the message in question,
in addition to pkS and pkC. The private input of S consists of the random
coins used to produce the signature µ on m.
confirm/deny〈C(skC),V〉(µ,m, pkS, pkC) These are interactive protocols between
the confirmer C and a verifier V. Their common input consists of pkS,
pkC, the alleged signature µ, and the message m. The confirmer uses skC
to convince the verifier of the validity/invalidity of the signature µ on m.
At the end, the verifier accepts or rejects the proof.
convertskC(µ,m, pkS, pkC) This is an algorithm run by the confirmerCusing skC,
in addition to pkC and pkS, on a potential confirmer signature µ and some
message m. The result is either ⊥ if µ is not a valid confirmer signature
on m, or a string σwhich is a valid digital signature on mw.r.t. pkS.
verifyconverted(σ,m, pkS) This is an algorithm for verifying converted sig-
natures. It inputs the converted signature σ, the message m and pkS and
outputs either 0 or 1.
Remark 3.1 (Notation) For the sake of simplicity, the public/private keys aswell as the
private coinswill be often omitted from the description of the above algorithms/protocols.
Therefore, whenever the context is clear, sign, sconfirm, {confirm, deny}, convert,
and verifyconverted will only involve the message and the corresponding con-
firmer/converted signature.
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Remark 3.2 In [49, 91], the authors give the possibility of obtaining directly digital
signatures on any given message. We find this unnecessary since it is already enough
that a CDCS scheme supports the convertibility feature.
3.2 Security model
A CDCS scheme should meet the following properties:
Completeness. Every signature produced by sign should be validated by the
algorithm verify and correctly converted. Moreover, valid signatures
should be correctly confirmed by sconfirm and confirm, and invalid
signatures should be correctly denied by deny if the entities {S,C} follow
honestly the protocols.
More formally, let (pkS, skS) and (pkC, skC) be the signer’s and confirmer’s
key pairs resp. of a CDCS scheme CS. Let further m be a message from
the message space of CS. We consider the following experiment
Experiment Exp
completeness
CS
(m, pkS, pkC)
1. µ ← CS.signskS (m, pkC);
2. ψ R←− CS.space:
CS.verifyskC (ψ,m, pkC , pkS) = 0;
3. out0 ← CS.verify{coinsµ ∨ skC}(µ,m, pkC, pkS);
4. 〈done | out1〉 ← CS.sconfirm〈S(coinsµ),V〉(µ,m, pkS, pkC);
5. 〈done | out2〉 ← CS.confirm〈C(skC),V〉(µ,m, pkS, pkC);
6. 〈done | out3〉 ← CS.deny〈C(skC),V〉(ψ,m, pkS, pkC);
7. σ← CS.convertskC (µ,m);
8. out4 ← CS.verifyconverted(σ,m);
9. Return out0 ∧ out1 ∧ out2 ∧ out3 ∧ out4.
The scheme CS complete if, for all signer’s and confirmer’s key pairs
(pkS, skS) and (pkC, skC) resp. , for all messages m, the outcome of Ex-
periment Expcompleteness
CS
(m, pkS, pkC) is 1 with high probability, where the
probability is taken over all the random choices.
Security for the verifier (soundness). This property informally means that an
adversary who compromises the private keys of both the signer and the
confirmer cannot convince the verifier of the validity (invalidity) of an
invalid (a valid) confirmer signature.
A CDCS scheme CS is sound if the success probability of any polynomial-
time adversaryA (returning 1) in Experiment ExpsoundnessCS,A (1
κ) is negligi-
ble; the probability is taken over all the random tosses.
Experiment ExpsoundnessCS,A (1
κ)
1. param ← setup(1κ);
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2. (pkS, skS)← CS.keygenS(1κ); (pkC, skC)← CS.keygenC(1κ);
3. (m, ψ)←A(skS, skC, coinsψ):
CS.verify{coinsψ ∨ skC}(ψ,m, pkC, pkS) = 0;
4. (m, µ)←A(skS, skC, coinsµ):
CS.verify{coinsµ ∨ skC}(µ,m, pkS, pkC) = 1;
5. 〈done | out1〉 ← CS.sconfirm〈A(skS ,skC ,coinsψ),V〉(ψ,m, pkS, pkC);
6. 〈done | out2〉 ← CS.confirm〈A(skS ,skC ,coinsψ),V〉(ψ,m, pkS, pkC);
7. 〈done | out3〉 ← deny〈A(skS ,skC ,coinsµ),V〉(µ,m, pkS, pkC);
8. Return out1 ∨ out2 ∨ out3.
Non-transferability. This property captures the simulatability of sconfirm,
confirm, and deny. It is defined through the following games which
involve the adversary, the signer and the confirmer of the CDCS scheme
CS, and a simulator (Experiment Exp
non−transferability
CS
(1κ) ):
Game 1: the adversary A is given the public keys of the signer and
of the confirmer, namely pkS and pkC resp. He can then make ar-
bitrary queries of type {sign, sconfirm} to the signer and of type
{confirm, deny} and convert to the confirmer. Eventually, the ad-
versary presents two strings m and µ for which he wishes to carry
out, on the common input (m, µ, pkS, pkC), the protocol sconfirm
with the signer (if µ has been just generated by the signer on m), or
the protocols {confirm, deny} with the confirmer. The private input
of the signer is the randomness used to generate the signature µ
(in case µ is a signature just generated by the signer), whereas the
private input of the confirmer is his private key skC. The adversary
continues issuing queries to both the signer and the confirmer until
he decides that this phase is over and produces an output.
Game 2: this game is similar to the previous one with the difference
of playing a simulator instead of running the real signer or the real
confirmer when it comes to the interaction of the adversary with the
signer in sconfirm or with the confirmer in {confirm, deny} on the
common input (µ,m, pkS, pkC). The simulator is not given the private
input of neither the signer nor the confirmer. It is however allowed
to issue a single oracle call that tells whether µ is a valid confirmer
signature on m w.r.t. pkS and pkC. Note that the simulator in this
game refers to a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine with
rewind.
Experiment Expnon−transferability
CS
(1κ)
1. param ← CS.setup(1κ);
2. (pkS, skS)← CS.keygenS(1κ); (pkC, skC)← CS.keygenC(1κ);
3. (m, µ)←AS,Cv,V(pkS, pkC)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : mi 7−→ CS.signskS (mi, pkC)
Cv : (µi,mi) 7−→ CS.convertskC (µi,mi, pkS, pkC)
V : (µi,mi) 7−→ CS.{sconfirm, confirm, deny}(µi,mi, pkS, pkC)
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4. b R←− {0, 1};
if b = 1 then 〈done | out0〉 ← prove〈P(skP),A〉(µ,m, pkS, pkC);
if b = 0 then 〈done | out1〉 ← prove〈Sim,A〉(µ,m, pkS, pkC);∣∣∣∣∣ if prove = CS.sconfirm then P = S and skP = coinsµif prove ∈ CS.{confirm, deny} then P = C and skP = skC
5. b⋆ ←AS,Cv,V(µ,m, pkS, pkC)
6. Return (b = b⋆).
The confirmer signatures are said to be non-transferable if there exists
an efficient simulator such that for all (pkS, pkC), the outputs of the ad-
versary in Game 1 and Game 2 are indistinguishable. In other words,
the adversary should not be able to tell whether he is playing Game 1 or
Game 2. Note that this definition achieves only the so-called offline non-
transferability, i.e. the adversary is not supposed to interact concurrently
with the prover and an unexpected verifier. We refer to Remark 3.3 for
the details.
Unforgeability. It isdefined through thegamedepicted inExperimentExpEUF−CMACS,A (1
κ):
the adversaryA gets the signer’s public key pkS of a CDCS scheme CS ,
and generates the confirmer’s key pair (skC,pkC). A is further allowed to
query the signer on polynomially many messages, say qs. At the end, A
outputs a pair consisting of a message m⋆, that has not been queried yet,
and a string µ⋆. A wins the game if µ⋆ is a valid confirmer signature on
m⋆.
Experiment ExpEUF−CMACS,A (1
κ)
1. param← setup(1κ);
2. (pkS, skS)← CS.keygenS(1κ);
3. (pkC, skC)←A(pkS);
4. (m⋆, µ⋆)←AS(pkS, pkC, skC)
S : m 7−→ CS.signskS (m, pkC)
5. return 1 if and only if:
- verify(µ⋆,m⋆, pkS, pkC) = 1
- m⋆ was not queried to S
We say that a CDCS scheme CS is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA secure if there is no
adversary, operating in time t, that wins the above game with probability
greater than ǫ, where the probability is taken over all the random choices.
Security for the confirmer (invisibility). Invisibility against a chosen message
attack (INV-CMA) is defined through the game between an attacker A
and her challengerC (ExperimentExpINV−CMACS,A (1
κ)): afterA gets the public
parameters of the CDCS scheme CS from C, she starts Phase 1where she
queries the sign, sconfirm, confirm, deny, and convert oracles in an
adaptive way. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, she outputs two
messages m⋆0 ,m
⋆
1
as challenge messages. C picks uniformly at random a
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bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then µ⋆ is generated using the signing oracle on themessage
m⋆
b
. Next, A starts adaptively querying the previous oracles (Phase 2),
with the exception of not querying (µ⋆,m⋆
i
), i = 0, 1, to the sconfirm,
{confirm, deny}, and convert oracles. At the end,A outputs a bit b⋆. She
wins the game if b = b⋆.
Experiment ExpINV−CMACS,A (1
κ)
1. param ← setup(1κ);
2. (pkS, skS)← CS.keygenS(1κ); (pkC, skC)← CS.keygenC(1κ);
3. (m⋆
0
,m⋆
1
,I)←AS,Cv,V(param, pkS, pkC)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ CS.signskS (m, pkC)
Cv : (µ,m) 7−→ CS.convertskC (µ,m, pkS, pkC)
V : (µ,m) 7−→ CS.{sconfirm, confirm,deny}{coinsµ∧skC}(µ,m)
4. b R←− {0, 1}; µ⋆ ← CS.signskS (m
⋆
b
, pkC)
5. b⋆ ←AS,Cv,V(guess,I, µ⋆, pkS, pkC)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ CS.signskS (m, pkC)
Cv : (µ,m)(, (µ⋆,m⋆
i
), i = 0, 1) 7−→ CS.convertskC (µ,m)
V : (µ,m)(, (µ⋆,m⋆
i
), i = 0, 1) 7−→
CS.{sconfirm, confirm, deny}(µ,m)
6. Return (b = b⋆).
We define A’s advantage as adv(A) =
∣∣∣Pr[b = b⋆] − 12 ∣∣∣, where the prob-
ability is taken over all the random coins. Finally, a CDCS scheme is
(t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if no adversary operating in time t, issu-
ing qs queries to the signing oracle (followed potentially by queries to
the sconfirm oracle), qv queries to the confirmation/denial oracles and qsc
queries to the selective conversion oracle that wins the above game with
advantage greater that ǫ. The probability is taken over all the coin tosses.
We have the following remarks regarding our security model:
Remark 3.3 • Online vs offline non-transferability. Our definition of non-
transferability is the same adopted in [20, 49, 91]. In particular, it thrives on the
concurrent zero knowledgeness of the {sconfirm, confirm, deny} protocols,
and guarantees only the so-called offline non-transferability.
In fact, non-transferability is not preserved, as remarked by [67], if the verifier
interacts concurrently with the prover and with an unexpected verifier.
One way to circumvent this shortcoming consists in requiring the mentioned
protocols to be designated verifier proofs [61], i.e. require the verifier to be
able to efficiently provide the proofs underlying sconfirm, confirm, and deny,
such that no efficient adversary is able to tell whether he is interacting with the
genuine prover or with the verifier. This approach was adhered to for instance
in [30, 73]. We will show that our proposed practical realizations of confirmer
signatures satisfy also this stronger notion of online non-transferability since
the protocols {sconfirm, confirm, deny} can be turned easily into Σ protocols
which can be in turn transformed efficiently into designated verifier proofs.
• Insider security (for the signer) againstmalicious confirmers. We consider
the insider security model against malicious confirmers in our definition of
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unforgeability. I.e. the adversary is allowed to choose his key pair (skC, pkC).
This is justified by the need of preventing the confirmer from impersonating
the signer by issuing valid signatures on his behalf. Hence, our definition
of unforgeability, which is the same as the one considered by [93], implies its
similars in [20, 49, 91].
• Insider vs outsider security for the confirmer. Our definition of invisibility,
namely INV-CMA, is considered in the outsider security model. I.e., the
adversary does not know the private key of the signer.
Actually, not only outsider security can be enough in many situations as argued
earlier in the introduction, but also, there seems to be no tangible extra power
that an insider attacker can gain from having access to the signing key. Actually,
the insider adversary in the definitions in [49, 91] (constructions from CtEaS)
is not allowed to ask the verification/conversion of valid confirmer signatures on
the challenge messages (otherwise his task would be trivial: it suffices to replace,
in the challenge confirmer signature, the digital signature on the commitment by
a new one and ask the resulting confirmer signature for verification/conversion).
This restriction involves for instance confirmer signatures that the adversary
may have forged on the challenge messages using his signing key.
Let’s see how this can translate into a real attack scenario: the insider adversary
A has compromised the signer’s key and wishes to break the invisibility of an
alleged signatureµ on somemessagem. Naturally, the restriction imposed earlier
can be achieved by the signer revoking his key and alerting the confirmer not to
verify/convert confirmer signatures involving the message m and potentially
further messages. The revocation of the signing key implies also not considering
signatures that have been issued after the key has been compromised. This leaves
Awith only verification/conversion queries onmessageswhere the corresponding
signatures have been issued by the genuine signer before the revocation of the
signing key. This seems to reduce A’s adversarial power down to that of an
outsider attacker.
Bottom line is outsider invisibility might be all that one needs and can have in
practice. Moreover, it allows the signer to sign the same message many times
without loss of invisibility, which is profoundly needed in licensing software.
• Invisibility vs non-transferability Our invisibility notion INV-CMA does
not guarantee the non-transferability of the signatures. I.e., the confirmer signa-
ture might convince the recipient that the signer was involved in the signature of
some message. We refer to the discussion in [49] (Section 3) for techniques that
can be used by the signer to camouflage the presence of valid signatures. We will
also propose some constructions (derived from a variant of the StE paradigm)
that achieve a stronger notion of invisibility; for such confirmer signatures, it
is difficult to distinguish a valid confirmer signature on some message from a
random string sampled from the signature space.
3.3 Classical constructions for confirmer signatures
Consider the following schemes:
• A digital signature scheme Σ, given by Σ.keygenwhich generates a key
pair (Σ.sk, Σ.pk), Σ.sign, and Σ.verify.
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[CS.setup(1κ)] : Σ.setup(1κ); Γ.setup(1κ)
[CS.keygenS(1
κ)] : Σ.keygen(1κ)
[CS.keygenC(1
κ)] : Γ.keygen(1κ)
[CS.sign(m)] : Γ.encryptΓ.pk(Σ.signΣ.sk(m))
[CS.sconfirm(µ,m)] : ZKPoK{(σ, coinsµ) : µ = Γ.encrypt{Γ.pk,coinsµ}(σ) ∧ Σ.verifyΣ.pk(σ,m) = 1}
[CS.confirm(µ,m)] : ZKPoK{(σ, Γ.sk) : σ = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ) ∧ Σ.verifyΣ.pk(σ,m) = 1}
[CS.deny(µ,m)] : ZKPoK{(σ, Γ.sk) : σ = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ) ∧ Σ.verifyΣ.pk(σ,m) = 0}
[CS.convert(µ,m)] : Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ)
[CS.verifyconverted(σ,m)] : Σ.verifyΣ.pk(σ,m)
Figure 1: The StE paradigm
• A public key encryption scheme, described by
Γ.keygen that generates the key pair (Γ.sk,Γ.pk),
Γ.encrypt, and Γ.decrypt.
We use the notation Γ.encrypt{Γ.pk,coins}(m) to refer to the ciphertext ob-
tained from encrypting the message m under the public key Γ.pk using
the random coins coins (encrypt is a probabilistic algorithm).
• A commitment schemeΩ, given by the algorithmsΩ.commit andΩ.open.
Let m be a message. We present now the most popular paradigms used to
devise a confirmer signature scheme CS from the aforementioned primitives.
Note that in all those paradigms, (Σ.pk,Σ.sk) forms the signer’s keypair,whereas
(Γ.pk,Γ.sk) forms the confirmer’s key pair.
Note that the security analysis of the following constructions is deferred to
Section 4 and Section .
3.3.1 The “sign-then-encrypt” (StE) paradigm
A CDCS scheme CS from the StE paradigm is depicted in Figure 1.
Note that the languages underlying sconfirm, confirm, and deny are in NP
and thus accept concurrent zero-knowledge proofs [38]. This guarantees the
completeness, soundness, and (offline) non-transferability of the resulting sig-
natures.
3.3.2 The “encrypt-then-sign” (EtS) paradigm
This paradigmwas first used in the context of signcryption. We can adapt it to
the case of convertible confirmer signatures by requiring a “trusted authority”
TA that runs the setup algorithm and generates a common reference string crs.
In fact, signature conversion will involve a non-interactive ZK proof (NIZK),
and thus the need for the crs (generated by a trusted authority) for the simula-
tion of the NIZK proof. We describe in Figure 2 confirmer signatures from such
a paradigm.
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[CS.setup(1κ)] : Σ.setup(1κ); Γ.setup(1κ); crs ← TA.setup(1κ)
[CS.keygenS(1
κ)] : Σ.keygen(1κ)
[CS.keygenC(1
κ)] : Γ.keygen(1κ)
[CS.sign(m)] : c← Γ.encryptΓ.pk(m); σ← Σ.signΣ.sk(c);
[CS.sconfirm({c, σ},m)] : ZKPoK{coinsc : c = Γ.encrypt{Γ.pk,coinsc }(m)}
[CS.confirm({c, σ},m)] : ZKPoK{Γ.sk : m = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(c)}
[CS.deny({c, σ},m)] : ZKPoK{Γ.sk : m , Γ.decryptΓ.sk(c)}
[CS.convert({c, σ},m)] : π← NIZK{m = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(c)}; return {π, c, σ}
[CS.verifyconverted({π, c, σ},m)] : NIZK.verify(crs, π); Σ.verifyΣ.pk(σ, c)
Figure 2: The EtS paradigm
Similarly, sconfirm, confirm, and deny amount to concurrent zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge since the underlying languages are in NP. It is worth noting
that the aforementioned protocols are only carried out when the signature σ on
the ciphertext c is valid, otherwise the confirmer signatureµ = (c, σ) is obviously
deemed invalid w.r.t. m. Finally, convert outputs (in case of a valid confirmer
signature on m) a zero knowledge non-interactive (NIZK) proof that m is the
decryption of c; such a proof is feasible since the underlying statement is in NP
([52] and [7]).
3.3.3 The “commit-then-encrypt-and-sign” (CtEaS) paradigm
This construction has the advantage of performing signature and encryption in
parallel in contrast to the previous sequential compositions. It includes among
its buildingblocks, contrarily to theprevious constructions, a public key encryp-
tion scheme that supports labels. The encryption with labels was introduced
in [91] in order to fix a flaw that afflicted the original proposal in [49]. More
precisely, a confirmer signature on a messagem is obtained by first committing
to m, then encrypting the randomness used in the commitment w.r.t. the label
m‖Σ.pk (Σ.pk is the public key of the used digital signature scheme), and finally
signing the commitment.
However, we remark that this repair will violate the invisibility of the re-
sulting construction. In fact, the standard security definitions for encryption
with labels do not require the label of a ciphertext to be hidden (since the label
is required as input to the decryption algorithm in order to correctly decrypt
the ciphertext). This implies that the signed message will be leaked from the
encryption of the randomness used for the commitment. We can remediate to
this problem by using public key encryption without labels to encrypt both the
randomness and m‖Σ.pk. We describe in Figure 3 our revised variant of this
paradigm.
Again, sconfirm, confirm, and deny are only carried out when the signature σ
on the commitment c is valid, otherwise the confirmer signature µ = (c, e, σ) is
clearly invalid w.r.t. m.
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[CS.setup(1κ)] : Σ.setup(1κ); Γ.setup(1κ); Ω.setup(1κ)
[CS.keygenS(1
κ)] : Σ.keygen(1κ)
[CS.keygenC(1
κ)] : Γ.keygen(1κ)
[CS.sign(m)] : c← Ω.commit(m, r); e← Γ.encryptΓ.pk(r‖m‖Σ.pk); σ← Σ.signΣ.sk(c);
[CS.sconfirm({c, e, σ},m)] : ZKPoK{(r, coinsc) : c = Ω.commit(m, r) ∧ e = Γ.encrypt{Γ.pk,coinsc }(r‖m‖Σ.pk)}
[CS.confirm({c, e, σ},m)] : ZKPoK{(r,Γ.sk) : c = Ω.commit(m, r) ∧ r‖m‖Σ.pk = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(e)}
[CS.deny({c, e, σ},m)] : ZKPoK{(r,Γ.sk) : c , Ω.commit(m, r) ∧ r‖m‖Σ.pk = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(e)}
[CS.convert({c, e, σ},m)] : r‖m‖Σ.pk ← Γ.decryptΓ.sk(c); return {r, c, σ}
[CS.verifyconverted({r, c, σ},m)] : c
?
= Ω.commit(m, r); Σ.verifyΣ.pk(σ, c)
Figure 3: The CtEaS paradigm
Remark 3.4 It is possible to require a proof in the convert algorithms of StE and
CtEaS, that the revealed information is indeed a correct decryption of the corresponding
encryption; such a proof is again possible to issue (with or without interaction) since
the underlying statement is in NP.
4 Negative Results for CDCS
In this section, we show that StE andCtEaS require at least IND-PCAencryption
in order to lead to INV-CMA secure confirmer signatures. We proceed as
follows.
First, we rule out the OW-CPA, OW-PCA, and IND-CPA notions by re-
marking that ElGamal’s encryption meets all those notions (under different
assumptions), but cannot be used in either StE or CtEaS. In fact, the invisibility
adversary can create from the challenge signature a new “equivalent” signature
(by re-encrypting the ElGamal encryption), and query it for conversion or veri-
fication to solve the challenge. Actually, this attack applies to any homomorphic
encryption.
Next, we show the insufficiency of OW-CCA and NM-CPA encryption by
means of efficient meta-reductions which forbid the existence of reductions
from the invisibility of the resulting confirmer signatures to the OW-CCA or
NM-CPAsecurity of theunderlying encryption. Wefirst show this impossibility
result for a specific kind of reductions, then we extend it to arbitrary reductions
assuming further assumptions on the used encryption.
Finally, as an illustration of our techniques, we provide evidence that the
well known Damgård-Pedersen’s signature [34] is, contrarily to what is conjec-
tured by the authors, unlikely to be indistinguishable under the DDH assump-
tion.
4.1 A breach in invisibility using homomorphic encryption
Definition 4.1 (Homomorphic encryption) Ahomomorphic public key encryption
scheme Γ given by Γ.keygen, Γ.encrypt, and Γ.decrypt has the following properties:
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1. The message spaceM and the ciphertext space C are groups w.r.t. some binary
operations ∗e and ◦e respectively.
2. ∀(sk, pk)← Γ.keygen(1κ) for any security parameter κ, ∀m,m′ ∈ M:
Γ.encryptpk(m ∗e m
′) = Γ.encryptpk(m) ◦e Γ.encryptpk(m
′).
Examples of homomorphic encryption 2 in the literature include ElGamal
[45], Paillier [75], and
Boneh-Boyen-Shacham [10]. All those schemes are IND-CPA secure (under
different assumptions).
Fact 4.1 The StE (CtEaS) paradigm cannot lead to INV-CMA secure confirmer sig-
natures when used with homomorphic encryption.
Proof Letm0,m1 be the challengemessages the invisibility adversaryAoutputs
to his challenger. Let further Γ, Σ, andΩ denote respectively the homomorphic
encryption, the digital signature, and the commitment used as building blocks.
• StE paradigm. A receives as a challenge confirmer signature some µb =
Γ.encrypt(Σ.sign(mb)), where b
R
←− {0, 1} and is asked to find b. To solve
his challenge,A obtains another encryption, say µ˜b, of
Σ.sign(mb) by multiplying µb with an encryption of the identity element.
According to the invisibility experiment, A can query µ˜b for conversion
or verification (w.r.t. either m0 or m1) and the answer to such a query is
sufficient forA to conclude.
• CtEaS paradigm. A gets as a challenge confirmer signature some µb =
[c = Ω.commit(mb, r), e,Σ.sign(c)] (b ∈ {0, 1}) where e is an encryption of
r‖mb‖Σ.pk. Similarly, A computes a new confirmer signature on mb by
multiplying ewith an encryption of the identity element (of the message
space of Γ). Then,A queries this new signature (w.r.t. eitherm0 orm1) for
conversion/verification, and the answer of the latter is sufficient forA to
conclude.
Remark 4.1 Note that the EtS paradigm is resilient to the previous attack since the
adversary would need to compute a valid digital signature on the newly computed
encryption. This is not plausible in the invisibility game (we consider outsider invis-
ibility).
Corollary 4.1 Invisibility in CDCS from StE and CtEaS cannot rest on OW-CPA,
OW-PCA, or IND-CPA encryption.
Proof ElGamal’s encryption [45] is homomorphic and meets the OW-CPA,
OW-PCA, and IND-CPA security notions (under different assumptions). The
rest follows from the previous fact.
2This encryption is not to confuse with the so-called fully homomorphic encryption which pre-
serves the entire ring structure of the plaintexts (supports both addition and multiplication).
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4.2 Impossibility results for key-preserving reductions
In this paragraph, we prove that NM-CPA and OW-CCA encryption are insuf-
ficient for invisible confirmer signatures from StE or CtEaS, if we consider a
certain type of reductions. We do this by means of efficient meta-reductions that
use such reductions (the algorithm reducingNM-CPA (OW-CCA) breaking the
underlying encryption scheme to breaking the invisibility of the construction)
to break the NM-CPA (OW-CCA) security of the encryption scheme. Thus,
if the encryption scheme is NM-CPA (OW-CCA) secure, the meta reductions
forbid the existence of such reductions. In case the encryption scheme is not
NM-CPA (OW-CCA) secure, such reductions will be useless.
Meta-reductions have been successfully used in a number of important
cryptographic results, e.g. the result in [14] which proves the impossibility of
reducing factoring, in a specefic kind of way, to the RSA problem, or the results
in [77, 76] which show that some well known signatures which are proven se-
cure in the random oracle may not conserve the same security in the standard
model. Such impossibility results are in general partial as they apply only for
certain reductions. Our result is also partial in a first stage since it requires
the reduction R, trying to attack a certain property of an encryption scheme
given by the public key Γ.pk, to provide the adversary against the confirmer
signature with the confirmer public key Γ.pk. In other terms, our result applies
for key-preserving reductions (see Definition 2.1). Our restriction to such a
class of reductions is not unnatural since, to our best knowledge, all the reduc-
tions basing the security of the generic constructions of confirmer signatures
on the security of their underlying components, feed the adversary with the
public keys of these components (signature schemes, encryption schemes, and
commitment schemes). Next, we use similar techniques to [78] to extend our
impossibility results to arbitrary reductions.
4.2.1 Insufficiency of OW-CCA encryption
Lemma 4.2 Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that converts an INV-
CMA adversary A against confirmer signatures from the StE (CtEaS) paradigm to a
OW-CCA adversary against the underlying encryption scheme. Then, there exists a
meta-reductionM that OW-CCA breaks the encryption scheme in question.
This lemma claims that if the considered encryption is OW-CCA secure, then,
there exists no key-preserving reductionR that reducesOW-CCA breaking it to
INV-CMAbreaking the construction (fromeither StE or CtEaS), or if there exists
such an algorithm, then the underlying encryption is not OW-CCA secure, thus
rendering such a reduction useless.
Proof Let R be the key-preserving reduction that reduces OW-CCA breaking
the encryption scheme underlying the construction to INV-CMA breaking the
construction itself. We will construct an algorithmM that uses R to OW-CCA
break the same encryption scheme by simulating an execution of the INV-CMA
adversaryA against the construction.
Let Γ be the encryption scheme M is trying to attack w.r.t. key Γ.pk. M
proceeds as follows:
• StE paradigm. Let c be the OW-CCA challengeM is asked to resolve. M
launches R over Γ under the same key Γ.pk and the same challenge c.
Obviously, all decryption queries made by R can be perfectly answered
usingM’s challenger (since they are different from the challenge c).
M needs now to simulate an INV-CMA adversary A to R. To do so, M
picks two randommessagesm0 andm1 from themessage space. To insure
that c is not a valid confirmer signature on m0 nor m1, M queries R for
the conversion of both (c,m0) and (c,m1) and makes sure that the result
to both queries is ⊥. If this is not the case, thenM will simply abort the
INV-CMA game, and output the result of the conversion, say σ (,⊥), to
his ownOW-CCA challenger. In fact, by definition, σ is a valid decryption
of c w.r.t. Γ.pk.
We assume now that c is not a valid confirmer signature on either m0 or
m1. Hence, M outputs m0,m1 to R as challenge messages, and receives
a challenge µb which is, with enough good probability, a valid confirmer
signature on mb for b ∈ {0, 1}. µb is according to our assumption different
from the challenge ciphertext c, andM is requested to find b. To solve his
challenge,M queries his own OW-CCA challenger for the decryption of
µb. The result to such a query allowsM to find out bwith probability one
(provided R supplies a correct simulation).
• CtEaS paradigm. M launches R over Γ with the same key Γ.pk and the
same challenge e. Thus, all decryption queries made by R, which are by
definition different from the challenge e, can be forwarded to M’s own
challenger.
At some point,M, acting as an INV-CMA attacker against the construc-
tion, outputs two challenge messages m0,m1 (chosen randomly from the
message space) and gets as response a challenge µb = (cb, eb, σb) which is,
with enough good probability, a valid confirmer signature onmb for some
b ∈ {0, 1}. M is asked to find b.
We first note that eb , e. In fact, with overwhelming probability, the
challenge e does not encrypt a string whose suffix is m0‖Σ.pk or m1‖Σ.pk
(although Σ.pk can be maliciously chosen by R, m0 and m1 are inde-
pendently chosen by M upon receipt of the challenge e). Therefore, M
requests his own challenger for the decryption of eb. The answer to such
a query will allow M (behaving as an INV-CCA attacker) to perfectly
answer his invisibility challenge.
To sum up, M is able to perfectly answer the decryption queries made by
R (that are by definition different from the OW-CCA challenge). M is further
capable of successfully simulating an INV-CMA attacker against the construc-
tion (from either StE or CtEaS), providedR supplies a correct simulation. Thus,
R is expected to return the answer to the OW-CCA challenge. Upon receipt of
this answer,Mwill forward it to his own challenger.
4.2.2 Insufficiency of NM-CPA encryption
Lemma 4.3 Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that converts an INV-
CMA adversaryA against confirmer signatures from the StE (CtEaS) paradigm to an
NM-CPA adversary against the underlying encryption scheme. Then, there exists a
meta-reductionM that NM-CPA breaks the encryption scheme in question.
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Proof Let R be the key-preserving reduction that reduces NM-CPA breaking
the encryption underlying the construction to INV-CMAbreaking the construc-
tion (from StE or CtEaS). We construct an algorithmM that uses R to NM-CPA
break the same encryption scheme by simulating an execution of the INV-CMA
adversaryA against the construction.
Let Γ be the encryption schemeM is trying to attack w.r.t. public key Γ.pk.
M will launch R over the same public key Γ.pk. Next, M will simulate an
INV-CMA adversary against the constructions:
• StE paradigm. M (behaving as A) queries R on two messages m0,m1
(m0 , m1) for confirmer signatures. Let µ0, µ1 be the corresponding
confirmer signatures resp. M further queries (µi,mi), i ∈ {0, 1}, for con-
version. Let σ0, σ1 be the corresponding answers respectively. We assume
that σ0 , σ1. If this is not the case, M repeats the experiment until this
holds (if all confirmer signatures are encryptions of the same string σ,
then the construction is not secure). At that point,M outputsD = {σ0, σ1},
to his NM-CPA challenger, as a distribution probability from which the
messages will be drawn. He gets a challenge encryption µ⋆, of either σ0
or σ1 under Γ.pk, and is asked to produce a ciphertext µ
′ whose corre-
sponding plaintext is meaningfully related to the decryption of µ⋆. To
solve his task, M queries for instance (µ⋆,m0) for conversion. If the re-
sult is σ0, i.e. µ
⋆ is a valid confirmer signature on m0, then M outputs
Γ.encryptpk(σ0) (m refers to the bit-complement of m) and the relation R:
R(m,m′) = (m′ = m). Otherwise,M outputs Γ.encryptpk(σ1) and the same
relation R. FinallyM aborts the INV-CMA game.
• CtEaS paradigm. Similarly,M queriesR onm0,m1 (m0 , m1) for confirmer
signatures. Let µ0 = (c0, e0, σ0) and µ1 = (c1, e1, σ1) be the corresponding
confirmer signatures. M queries again µ0, µ1, along with the correspond-
ing messages, for conversion. Let r0 and r1 be the the randomnesses
used to generate the commitments c0 and c1 on m0 and m1 resp. M in-
putsD = {r0‖m0‖Σ.pk, r1‖m1‖Σ.pk} to his own challenger as a distribution
probability from which the plaintexts will be drawn. M will receive as
a challenge encryption e⋆. At that point, M chooses a bit b
R
←− {0, } , and
queriesR onµ⋆ = (cb, e
⋆, σb) and themessagemb for conversion. Note that
if e⋆ encrypts rb‖mb‖Σ.pk, thenµ
⋆ is a valid confirmer signature onmb, oth-
erwise it is invalid. Therefore, if the outcome of the query is not⊥, thenM
outputs Γ.encryptpk(rb), where rb refers to the bit-complement of rb, and
the relation R: R(r, r′) = (r′ = r). Otherwise,M outputs Γ.encryptpk(r1−b)
and the same relation R. FinallyM aborts the INV-CMA game.
Clearly, M solves correctly his NM-CPA challenge if R provides a correct
simulation.
4.2.3 Putting all together
Theorem 4.4 Consider the security notions obtained from pairing a security goal
goal ∈ {OW, IND,NM} and an attack model atk ∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA}. The encryption
scheme underlying the above constructions (from either StE or CtEaS) must be at least
IND-PCA secure, in case the considered reduction is key-preserving, in order to achieve
INV-CMA secure confirmer signatures.
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Proof Corollary 4.1 rules out OW-CPA, OW-PCA, and IND-CPA encryption.
Moreover, Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 rule out OW-CCA and NM-CPA encryp-
tion resp. The next notion to be considered is IND-PCA.
Remark 4.2 Note that the notions OW-CPA, OW-PCA, and IND-CPA are discarded
regardless of the used reduction. In fact, we managed to exhibit an encryption scheme
(ElGamal’s encryption) which meets all those notions, but leads to insecure confirmer
signatures when used in the StE or CtEaS paradigms.
Remark 4.3 The step of ruling out OW-CPA, OW-PCA, and IND-CPA is necessary
although we have proved the insufficiency of stronger notions, namely OW-CCA and
NM-CPA. In fact, suppose there is an efficient “useful” key-preserving reductionR (i.e.
R solves a presumably hard problem) which reduces OW-PCA breaking a cryptosystem
Γ underlying a StE or CtEaS construction to INV-CMA breaking the construction
itself. Then there exists an efficient key-preserving reduction say R′ that reduces OW-
CCA breaking Γ to INV-CMA breaking the construction (OW-CCA is stronger than
OW-PCA). This does not contradict Lemma 4.2 as long as Γ is not OW-CCA secure
(although it is OW-PCA secure). In other terms, since there are separations between
OW-CCA andOW-PCA (same for the other notions), we cannot apply the insufficiency
of OW-CCA (NM-CPA) to rule out the weaker notions.
This necessity will become more apparent in Section 9 as we mention how to rule out
OW-CCA secure encryption in constructions of verifiably encrypted signatures (VES)
from StE, yet there exists many realizations of secure VES realizing StE that use OW-
PCA encryption (e.g. ElGamal’s encryption in bilinear groups) as a building block,
e.g. the VES [11].
On the resort to meta-reductions It is tempting to envisage stronger tech-
niques than meta-reductions in order to achieve the aforementioned negative
results. In fact, meta-reductions give only partial results as they consider a
specific class of reductions, e.g. key-preserving reductions.
For instance, one might try to adapt existing results that separate security
notions in encryption, e.g. [4]. The problem is that the invisibility adversary
in confirmer signatures does not have explicit access to a decryption oracle,
i.e. the adversary gets the decryption of a ciphertext only if the latter is part
of a valid confirmer signature on some message. Therefore, the separation
techniques used in encryption cannot be straightforwardly used in case of
confirmer signatures.
Another possibility consists in building simple counter examples of encryption
schemes which are OW-CCA (NM-CPA) secure but lead to insecure confirmer
signatures when used in the StE or CtEaS paradigms. Again, it seems difficult
to achieve results using this approach without assuming special security prop-
erties on the used digital signature scheme, i.e. consider signature schemes that
are not strongly unforgeable.
The merit of meta-reductions lies in achieving separation results regardless of
the used digital signature.
We will see in the next subsection how to extend our negative results if the
encryption underlying the constructions satisfies further security properties.
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4.3 Extension to arbitrary reductions
To extend the results of the previous paragraph to arbitrary reductions, we first
define the notion of non-malleability of an encryption scheme key generator through
the following two games:
In Game 0, we consider an algorithm R trying to break an encryption scheme
Γ, w.r.t. a public key Γ.pk, in the sense of NM-CPA (or OW-CCA) using an ad-
versaryA which solves a problem A, perfectly reducible to OW-CPA breaking
the encryption scheme Γ. In this game, R launches A over his own challenge
key Γ.pk and some other parameters chosen freely by R (according to the spec-
ifications of A). We will denote by adv0(RA) the success probability of R in
such a game, where the probability is taken over the random tapes of both R
and A. We further define succGame0
Γ
(A) = maxR adv0(RA) to be the success in
Game 0 of the best reductionRmaking the best possible use of the adversaryA.
Note that the goal ofGame 0 is to include all key-preserving reductionsR from
NM-CPA (or OW-CCA) breaking the encryption scheme in question to solving
a problem A, which is reducible to OW-CPA breaking the same encryption
scheme.
In Game 1, we consider the same entities as in Game 0, with the exception of
providing R with, in addition toA, a OW-CPA oracle (i.e. a decryption oracle
corresponding to Γ) that he can query w.r.t. any public key Γ.pk′ , Γ.pk, where
Γ.pk is the challenge public key of R. Similarly, we define adv1(RA) to be the
success of R in such a game, and succGame1
Γ
(A) = maxR adv1(RA) the success
in Game 1 of the reduction R making the best possible use of the adversaryA
and of the decryption (OW-CPA) oracle.
Definition 4.2 An encryption scheme Γ is said to have a non-malleable key generator
if
∆ = maxA
∣∣∣succGame1
Γ
(A) − succGame0
Γ
(A)
∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter.
Thisdefinition informallymeans that an encryption schemehas a non-malleable
key generator if NM-CPA (or OW-CCA) breaking it w.r.t. a key pk is no easier
when given access to a decryption (OW-CPA) oracle w.r.t. any public key
pk′ , pk.
We generalize now our impossibility results to arbitrary reductions as fol-
lows.
Theorem 4.5 Theorem 4.4 is still valid when considering arbitrary reductions, pro-
vided the encryption scheme underlying the constructions (from either StE or CtEaS)
has a non-malleable key generator.
To prove this theorem, we first need the following lemma (similar to Lemma
6 of [78])
Lemma 4.6 LetA be an adversary solving a problem A, reducible to OW-CPA break-
ing an encryption scheme Γ, and let R be an arbitrary reduction R that NM-CPA
(OW-CCA) breaks Γ given access toA. We have adv(R) ≤ succGame1
Γ
(A).
Proof We will construct an algorithm M that plays Game 1 with respect to a
perfect oracle forA and succeeds in breaking the NM-CPA (OW-CCA) security
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of Γwith the same success probability ofR. AlgorithmM gets a challenge w.r.t.
a public key pk and launches R over the same challenge and the same public
key. If R callsA on pk, thenM will call his own oracle for A. Otherwise, if R
callsA on pk′ , pk,Mwill invoke his own decryption oracle for pk′ (OW-CPA
oracle) to answer the queries. In fact, by assumption, the problemA is reducible
to OW-CPA breaking Γ. Finally, when R outputs the result toM, the latter will
output the same result to his own challenger.
The proof of Theorem 4.5 is similar to that of Theorem 5 in [78]:
Proof We first remark that the invisibility of the constructions in question is
perfectly reducible to OW-CPA breaking the encryption scheme underlying the
construction.
Next, we note that the advantage of the meta-reduction M in the proof of
Lemma 4.3 (Lemma 4.2) is at least the same as the advantage of any key-
preserving reduction R reducing the invisibility of a given confirmer signature
to the NM-CPA (OW-CCA) security of its underlying encryption scheme Γ. For
instance, this applies to the reduction making the best use of an invisibility
adversary A against the construction. Therefore we have: succGame0
Γ
(A) ≤
succ(NM-CPA[Γ]), where succ(NM-CPA[Γ]) is the success of breaking Γ in the
NP-CPA sense. We also have succGame0
Γ
(A) ≤ succ(OW-CCA[Γ]). Now, Let
R be an arbitrary reduction from NM-CPA (OW-CCA) breaking an encryp-
tion scheme Γ, with a non-malleable key generator, to INV-CMA breaking the
construction (using the same encryption scheme Γ). We have
adv(R) ≤ succGame1
Γ
(A)
≤ succGame0Γ (A) + ∆
≤ min {succ(NM-CPA[Γ], succ(OW-CCA[Γ])} + ∆
since ∆ is negligible, if Γ is NM-CPA (OW-CCA) secure, then the advantage of
R is also negligible.
Existenceof encryptionwith a non-malleablekey generator It is not difficult
to see that factoring or RSA based encryption schemes are the first candidates to
have a non-malleable key generator. In fact, if the public key in these schemes
consists only of an RSA modulus n, then factorization of other moduli will not
help factoring n. Examples of such schemes are countless and include OAEP
[5], REACT-RSA [74], PKCS#1 v2.2 [83], Rabin and related systems (Williams
[94], Blum-Goldwasser [8], Chor-Goldreich[28]), the EPOC family, Paillier [75],
etc.
Discrete-log based encryption schemes fail however into this category. Actu-
ally, a discrete-log oracle w.r.t. some generator of a given group is sufficient to
extract the discrete-log of any element (w.r.t. any element) in this group. There-
fore, extension of the above separation results is not straightforward for these
schemes; it must use the specific properties of the used encryption scheme. We
provide an illustration of such an extension in the next subsection.
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4.4 Analysis of Damgård-Pedersen’s [34] undeniable signa-
tures
Let m ∈ {0, 1}⋆ be an arbitrary message. Damgård-Pedersen’s confirmer signa-
ture consists of the following procedures:
Setup (setup). On input the security parameter κ, generate a k-bit prime t
and a prime p ≡ 1 mod t. Furthermore, select a collision-resistant hash
function H that maps arbitrary-length messages to Zt.
Key generation (keygen). Generate g of order t, x ∈ Z×t , and h = g
x mod p.
Furthermore, select a generator α of Z×t and ν ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}, and
compute β = αν mod t. The public key is pk = (p, t, g, h, α, β) and the
private key is (x, ν).
Signature (sign). The signer first computes an ElGamal signature (s, r) on
m, i.e. compute r = gb mod p for some b
R
←− Z×t , then compute s as
h(m) = rx + bs mod t. Next, he computes an ElGamal encryption (E1 =
αρ,E2 = sβ
ρ) mod t, for ρ
R
←− Zt−1, of s. The undeniable signature on m is
the triple (E1,E2, r).
Confirmation/Denial protocol (confirm/deny). Toconfirm (deny) a purported
signature (E1,E2, r) on a certain message m, the signer issues a ZKPoK of
the language: (see [34] )
{
s : DLα(β) = DLE1(E2 · s−1) ∧ gh(m)h−r = (,)rs
}
In [34], the authors prove that the above signatures are unforgeable if the
underlying ElGamal signature is also unforgeable, and they conjecture that the
signatures meet the following invisibility notion if the problem DDH is hard:
Definition 4.3 (Signature indistinguishability) It is defined through the follow-
ing game between an attackerA (a distinguisher) and his challenger R.
Phase 1 afterA gets the public key of the scheme pk, from R, he starts issuing status
requests and signature requests. In a status request,A produces a pair (m, z),
and receives a 1-bit answer which is 1 iff z is a valid undeniable signature on
m w.r.t. pk. In a signature request, A produces a message m and receives an
undeniable signature z on it w.r.t. pk.
ChallengeOnceA decides thatPhase 1 is over, he outputs a message m and receives
a string z which is either a valid undeniable signature on m (w.r.t pk) or a
randomly chosen string from the signature space.
Phase 2A resumes adaptively making the previous types of queries, provided that m
does not occur in any request, and that z does not occur in any status request.
Eventually,A will output a bit.
Let pr, resp. ps be the probability that A answers 1 in the real, resp. the simulated
case. Both probabilities are taken over the random coins of bothA and R. We say that
the signatures are indistinguishable if |pr − ps| is a negligible function in the security
parameter.
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It is clear that the Damgård-Pedersen signatures do not provide the INV-
CMA notion according to Subsection 4.1. In the rest of this section, we provide
evidence that the Damgård-Pedersen signatures are unlikely to meet the above
indistinguishability notion under the DDH assumption.
Lemma 4.7 Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that uses an indistin-
guishability adversary A (in the sense of Definition 4.3) against the above scheme to
solve the DDH problem. Then, there exists an efficient meta-reductionM that solves
the DDH problem.
Proof Let R be the key-preserving reduction that reduces the DDH problem to
distinguishing the Damgård-Pedersen signatures in the sense of Definition 4.3.
We will construct an algorithm M that uses R to solve the DDH problem by
simulating a distinguisher against the signatures.
Let (α, β, c1 = α
a, c2 = β
b) ∈ Z×t ×Z
×
t be theDDH instanceM is asked to solve.
M acting as a distinguisher of the signature will make a signature request on
an arbitrary message m. Let (E1,E2, r) be the answer to such a query. M will
make now a status query on (c1 · E1, c2 · E2, r) and the message m. (α, β, c1, c2) is
a yes-Diffie-Hellman instance iff the result of the last query is the confirmation
that (c1 · E1, c2 · E2, r) is a signature on m.
Extension to arbitrary reductions. We cannot employ, in this case, the non-
malleability of the key generator technique discussed above. In fact, this would
correspond to assuming that the DDH problem, w.r.t. a given public key pk, is
difficult even when given access to a CDH oracle w.r.t. any pk′ , pk, which is
untrue.
However, we can see that the result still holds true if R feeds the adversaryA
with the confirmer key (α′, β′) = (αℓ, βℓ) for some ℓ not necessarily known toM.
In fact,M (orA) checks that (α′, β′, α, β) is aDiffie-Hellman tuple byfirstmaking
a signature request on somemessage, then making a status request on the same
message and on the product of the corresponding confirmer signature and
the tuple (α, β, 1) (the answer to such a status request should be the execution
of the confirmation oracle). Next, A checks his DDH instance (α, β, c1, c2) by
using the same technique, namely first make a signature request on some
message, followed by a status request on the same message and the product
of the returned signature with the tuple (c1, c2, 1). The answer to this query is
sufficient forM to conclude.
Finally, Damgård-Pedersen’s undeniable signatures can be repaired so as
to provide invisibility by producing ElGamal’s signature on the message to be
signed concatenated with the used encapsulation E1. In Section 5.2, we will see
that this repair is a special instance of our new StE paradigm for CDCS.
5 Positive Results for CDCS
The above negative results are due, to a large extent, to the strong forgeability of
the confirmer signatures from StE or CtEaS. I.e. a polynomial-time adversary
is able to produce, given a valid confirmer signature on some message, another
valid confirmer signature on the same message without the help of the signer;
the attacker requests the conversion of the given confirmer signature and then
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obtain a new confirmer signature on the samemessage by simply re-encrypting
the response (note that a conversion query is not necessary if the used encryp-
tion scheme is homomorphic according to Subsection 4.1). Therefore, any
reduction R from the invisibility of the construction to the security of the un-
derlying encryption scheme will need more than a list of records maintaining
the queried messages along with the corresponding confirmer and digital sig-
natures. Thus the insufficiency of notions like IND-CPA. In [20, 49, 91], the
authors stipulate that the given reduction would need a decryption oracle (of
the encryption scheme) in order to handle the queries made by the INV-CMA
attacker A, which makes the invisibility of the constructions rest on the IND-
CCA security of the encryption scheme. In this section, we remark that the
queries made byA are not completely uncontrolled by R; they are encryptions
of some data already released by R, provided the digital signature scheme is
strongly unforgeable, and thus known to her. Therefore, a plaintext checking
oracle suffices to handle those queries.
The rest of this section will be organized as follows. In Subsection 5.1, we
show that StE and CtEaS can thrive on IND-PCA encryption provided the used
signature scheme is SEUF-CMA secure. Next, in Subsections 5.2 & 5.3, we
propose efficient variants of secure StE and CtEaS respectively which rest on
IND-CPA encryption.
5.1 Sufficiency of IND-PCA encryption
Theorem 5.1 (StE paradigm) Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N
4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, con-
firmer signatures from StE are (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if the underlying dig-
ital signature is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure and the underlying encryption scheme is
(t + qsqsc(qsc + qv), ǫ · (1 − ǫ
′)(qsc+qv), qsc(qsc + qv))-IND-PCA secure.
Proof Let A be an attacker that (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA breaks a confirmer
signature from StE, believed to use a (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA signature scheme.
We construct an algorithm R that IND-PCA breaks the underlying encryption:
[keygen]R gets the public parameters of the target encryption scheme fromher
challenger, that are Γ.pk , Γ.encrypt, and Γ.decrypt. Then, she chooses
a secure signature scheme Σ with parameters Σ.pk, Σ.sk, Σ.sign, and
Σ.verify.
[sign queries] For a signature query on a message m, R proceeds exactly as
the standard algorithm using Σ.sk and Γ.pk. R further maintains internally
in a list L the queried messages along with the corresponding confirmer
signatures and the intermediate values namely the digital signatures (on
the message) and the random nonce used to produce the confirmer signa-
tures. It is clear that this simulation is indistinguishable from the standard
sign algorithm.
[sconfirm queries] R executes the standard sconfirm protocol on a just gen-
erated signature using the randomness used to produce the confirmer
signature in question.
[convert queries] For a putative confirmer signature µ on m, R will look up
the list L. We note that each record of L comprises four components,
31
namely, (1) mi : the queried message (2) σi : the digital signature on
mi (3) µi = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(σi) : the confirmer signature on mi (4) ri : the
randomness used to encrypt σi in µi.
If no record having as first component the message m appears in L, then
Rwill output ⊥.
Otherwise, let t be the number of records having as first component the
message m. R will invoke the plaintext checking oracle (PCA) furnished
by her own challenger on (σi, µ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where σi corresponds to
the second component of such records. If the PCA oracle identifies µ as a
valid encryption of some σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, then Rwill return σi, otherwise she
will return ⊥.
This simulation differs from the real one when the signature µ is valid
and was not obtained from the signing oracle. We note that the only
ways to create a valid confirmer signature without the help of R consist
in either encrypting a digital signature obtained from the conversion or-
acle or coming up with a new fresh pair of message and corresponding
signature (m, µ). R can handle the first case using her PCA oracle and
list of records L. In the second case, we can distinguish two sub-cases:
either m has not been queried to the signing oracle in which case the
pair (m, µ) corresponds to an existential forgery on the confirmer signa-
ture scheme and thus to an existential forgery on the underlying digital
scheme according to [20, Theorem 1], or m has been queried to the sign-
ing oracle but Γ.decrypt(µ) is not an output of the selective conversion
oracle, which corresponds to a strong existential forgery on the underly-
ing digital signature. Therefore, the probability that this scenario does
not happen is at least (1 − ǫ′)qsc because the underlying digital signature
scheme is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure by assumption.
[{confirm, deny} queries]Rwill proceed exactly as in the selective conversion
with the exception of simulating the denial protocol instead of returning
⊥, or the confirmation protocol instead of returning the converted digital
signature (the {confirm, deny} protocols are concurrent zero-knowledge
proofs, and thus they are simulatable). This simulation does not deviate
from the standard execution of the protocols by at least (1 − ǫ′)qv .
[Challenge phase] Eventually,A outputs two challenge messages m0 andm1.
Rwill then compute two signatures σ0 and σ1 on m0 and m1 respectively,
which she gives to her own IND-PCA challenger. R receives then the
challenge µ⋆, as the encryption of either σ0 or σ1, which she will forward
toA.
[Post challenge phase] A will continue issuing queries to the signing, con-
firmation/denial and selective conversion oracles and R can answer as
previously. Note that in this phase, A is not allowed to query the se-
lective conversion or the confirmation/denial oracles on (mi, µ
⋆), i = 0, 1.
Also, R is not allowed to query her PCA oracle on (µ⋆, σi), i = 0, 1. Again,
the probability to not deviate from the real invisibility game is at least
(1 − ǫ′)qsc+qv .
[Final output] When A outputs his answer b ∈ {0, 1}, R will forward this
very answer to her own challenger. Therefore R will IND-PCA break the
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underlying encryption scheme with advantage at least ǫ · (1− ǫ′)(qv+qsc), in
time at most t + qsqsc(qv + qsc) after at most qsc(qsc + qv) queries to the PCA
oracle.
Theorem 5.2 (CtEaS paradigm) Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈ N
4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2,
confirmer signatures from CtEaS are (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if they use a
(t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure digital signature, a statistically hiding and (t, ǫb) binding
commitment, and a (t+qsqsc(qsc+qv),
ǫ
2 ·[(1−ǫ
′)·(1−ǫb)]
(qsc+qv), qsc(qsc+qv))-IND-PCA
secure encryption scheme.
Proof Let A be an attacker against the CtEaS construction. We construct an
attacker R against the underlying encryption:
[setup and keygen]. R gets the parameters of the encryption scheme Γ from
her challenger. Then she chooses a (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA digital signature
Σ (along with a key pair (Σ.pk,Σ.sk)) and a secure commitment Ω.
[sign and sconfirm queries]. R proceeds exactly like the standard algo-
rithm/protocol, with the exception of maintaining, in case of sign, in a
listL the queried messages, the corresponding confirmer signatures, and
the intermediate values used to produce these, for instance the random
strings used to produce the commitments.
[convert and {confirm, deny} queries] To convert an alleged signature µi =
(ci, ei, σi) on a message mi, R checks the validity of σi on ci; if it is invalid,
then R proceeds as prescribed by the standard algorithm. Otherwise, R
checks the list L for records corresponding to the queried message mi
and where ci has been used as a commitment on mi. If ei is found in one
of these records as encryption of some ri concatenated with mi‖Σ.pk (ri
is the opening value of ci), then R proceeds as dictated by the standard
algorithm. Otherwise,R queries her PCAoracle on ei and on each opening
value of ci found in these records (concatenated always with mi‖Σ.pk). R
returns the opening value giving rise to a ’yes’ response (by the PCA
oracle), if any, otherwise she returns ⊥.
Verification ({confirm, deny}) queries are handled similarly with the ex-
ception of simulating the denial protocol instead of returning ⊥, and the
confirmation protocol instead of converting the signature.
This simulation differs from the standard procedure when µi is valid,
but mi has not been queried before, or ci has not been used to generate
commitments on mi. The first case corresponds to an existential forgery
on the construction which translates into breaking the binding property
of the commitment scheme if ci has been used a commitment on some
message m j , mi, or to breaking the existential unforgeability of the
underlying digital signature otherwise. The second case corresponds to
an existential forgery on the underlying signature scheme. Both cases do
not happen with probability at least [(1 − ǫ′) · (1 − ǫb)]
qv+qsc .
[Challenge phase] At some point, A outputs two messages m0,m1 to R. The
latter chooses a random string r from the corresponding space. R outputs
to her challenger the strings r‖m0‖Σ.pk and r‖m1‖Σ.pk. She receives then a
ciphertext eb, encryption of r‖mb‖Σ.pk, for some b ∈ {0, 1}. To answer her
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challenger, R chooses a bit b′
R
←− {0, 1}, computes a commitment cb′ on the
messagemb′ using the string r. Then, R outputs µ = (cb′ , eb,Σ.signΣ.sk(cb′))
as a challenge signature toA.
Two cases: either µ is a valid confirmer signature on mb′ (if b = b
′), or
it is not a valid signature on either m0 or m1. However, since the used
commitment is statistically hiding, i.e. cb′ reveals no information about
mb′ , then µ is conform to a challenge signature in a real INV-CMA game.
[Post challengephase]A continues to issue queries andR continues to handle
them as before. Note that at this stage, R cannot request her PCA oracle
on (eb, r‖mi‖Σ.pk), i ∈ {0, 1}. R would need to make such a query if she
gets a verification (conversion) query on a signature (ci, eb, σi) , µ and the
message mi ∈ {m0,m1}. R will respond to such a query by running the
denial protocol (output⊥). This simulation differs from the real algorithm
when (ci, eb, σi) is valid on mi. Again, such a scenario won’t happen
with probability at least (1 − ǫ′)qv+qsc , because the query would form a
strong existential forgery on the digital signature scheme underlying the
construction.
[Final output] The rest of the proof follows in a straightforward way. Let ba
be the bit output by A. R will output b′ to her challenger in case b′ = ba
and 1 − b′ otherwise.
The advantage of A in such an attack is defined by ǫ = adv(A) =∣∣∣Pr[ba = b′|b = b′] − 12 ∣∣∣
We assume again without loss of generality that ǫ = Pr[ba = b
′|b = b′]− 12 .
The advantage of R by definition the product psim · pchal, where psim is the
probability of providing a simulation indistinguishable from that in a real
attack; it is equal to [(1− ǫb) · (1− ǫ
′)]qv+qsc . Whereas pchal is the probability
that R solves her challenge provided the simulation is correct:
pchal =
[
Pr[b′ = ba, b = b
′] + Pr[b′ , ba, b , b
′] −
1
2
]
=
1
2
[Pr[b′ = ba|b = b
′] + Pr[b′ , ba|b , b
′] − 1]
=
[
1
2
(ǫ +
1
2
+
1
2
− 1)
]
=
ǫ
2
Actually, Pr[b , b′] = Pr[b = b′] = 12 as b
′ R←− {0, 1}. Moreover, if b , b′,
then the probability thatA answers 1− b′ is 12 (since µ is invalid on either
m0 or m1).
5.2 An efficient variant of StE
One attempt to circumvent the problem of strong forgeability of constructions
obtained from the plain StE paradigm can be achieved by binding the digital
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signature to its encryption. In this way, froma digital signature σ and amessage
m, an adversary cannot create a new confirmer signature on m by just re-
encrypting σ. In fact, σ forms a digital signature on m and some data, say c,
which uniquely defines the confirmer signature onm. Moreover, this data c has
to be public in order to issue the {sconfirm, confirm, deny} protocols.
In this subsection, we propose a realization of this idea using hybrid en-
cryption (the KEM/DEM paradigm). We also allow more flexibility without
compromising the overall security by encrypting only one part of the signature
and leaving out the other part, provided it does not reveal information about
the key nor about the message.
5.2.1 The construction
Let Σ be a digital signature scheme given by Σ.keygen, which generates a key
pair (Σ.sk, Σ.pk), Σ.sign, and Σ.verify. Let further K be a KEM given by
K .keygen, which generates a key pair (K .pk, K .sk), K .encap, and K .decap.
Finally, we consider a DEMD given byD.encrypt andD.decrypt.
We assume that any digital signature σ, generated using Σ on an arbitrary
message m, can be efficiently transformed in a reversible way to a pair (s, r)
where r reveals no information about m nor about (Σ.sk,Σ.pk). I.e. there exists
an algorithm that inputs a message m and a key pair (Σ.sk,Σ.pk) and outputs
a string statistically indistinguishable from r, where the probability is taken
over the messages and the key pairs considered by Σ. This technical detail will
improve the efficiency of the construction as it will not necessitate encrypting
the entire signature σ, but only the message-key-dependent part, namely s.
Finally, we assume that s belongs to the message space ofD.
We further assume that the encapsulations generated by K are exactly κ-
bit long, where κ is a security parameter. This can be for example realized
by padding with zeros, on the left of the most significant bit of the given
encapsulation, until the resulting string has length κ. Moreover, the operator ‖
denotes the usual concatenation operation between two bit-strings. As a result,
the first bit of m will always be at the (κ + 1)-th position in c‖m, where c is a
given encapsulation.
The construction of confirmer signatures from Σ, K , and D is given as
follows.
Key generation (keygen). Set the signer’s key pair to (Σ.sk,Σ.pk) and the
confirmer’s key pair to (K .sk,K .pk).
Signature (sign). Fix a key k together with its encapsulation c. Then, compute
a (digital) signature σ = Σ.signΣ.sk(c‖m) = (s, r) on c‖m, and output µ =
(c,D.encryptk(s), r).
Verification ({sconfirm, confirm, deny}). To confirm (deny) a purported sig-
nature µ = (c, e, r), issued on a certain message m, the prover (either the
signer or the confirmer) provides a concurrent zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge of the decryption of (c, e), which together with r forms a valid
(invalid) signature on c‖m. Providing such a proof is possible since the
underlying statement is an NP language [38].
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Selective conversion (convert). To convert a signature µ = (c, e, r) issued on
a certain message m, the confirmer first checks its validity. If it is invalid,
he outputs ⊥, otherwise, he computes k = K .decapK .sk(c) and outputs
(D.decryptk(e), r).
Theorem 5.3 Given (t, qs) ∈ N
2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the above construction is (t, ǫ, qs)-
EUF-CMA secure if the underlying digital signature scheme is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA
secure.
Proof LetA be an attacker that (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA breaks the above construc-
tion. The algorithm R (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA breaks the underlying digital signa-
ture scheme Σ as follows:
[Key generation] R gets the parameters of Σ from her challenger. Then she
chooses an appropriate KEM K and DEM D and asks A to provide
her with the confirmer key pair (K .sk,K .pk). Finally, R fixes the above
parameters as a setting for the confirmer signature schemeA is trying to
attack.
[Signature queries] For a signature query on a message m, R computes an
encapsulation c together with its decapsulation k (using Γ.pk). Then,
she requests her challenger for a digital signature σ = (s, r) on c‖m. Fi-
nally, she encrypts s inD.encryptk(s) and outputs the confirmer signature
(c,D.encryptk(s), r).
[Final Output] Once A outputs his forgery µ⋆ = (c⋆, e⋆, r⋆) on m⋆. R will
compute the decapsulation of c⋆, say k. If µ⋆ is valid then by definition
(D.decryptk(e
⋆), r⋆) is a valid digital signature on c⋆‖m⋆. Thus,R outputs
(D.decryptk(e
⋆), r⋆) and c⋆‖m⋆ as a valid existential forgery on Σ. In fact,
if, during a query made by A on a message mi, R is compelled to query
her own challenger for a digital signature on c⋆‖m⋆ = ci‖mi, thenm⋆ = mi
(by construction), which contradicts the fact that (µ⋆,m⋆) is an existential
forgery output byA.
The following remark is vital for the invisibility of the resulting confirmer
signatures.
Remark 5.1 The previous theorem shows that existential unforgeability of the un-
derlying digital signature scheme suffices to ensure existential unforgeability of the
resulting construction. Actually, one can also show that this requirement on the digital
signature (EUF-CMA security) guarantees that no adversary, against the construc-
tion, can come up with a valid confirmer signature µ = (c, e, r) (c is the encapsulation
used to generate the confirmer signature µ) on a message m that has been queried
before to the signing oracle but where c was never used to generate answers (confirmer
signatures) to the signature queries.
To prove this claim, we construct from such an adversary, say A, an EUF-CMA
adversary R against the underlying digital signature scheme, which runs in the same
time and has the same advantage as A. In fact, R will simulate A’s environment
in the same way described in the proof of Theorem 5.3. When A outputs his forgery
µ⋆ = (c⋆, e⋆, r⋆) on a message mi that has been previously queried to the signing oracle,
R decrypts (c⋆, e⋆) in s⋆, which by definition forms, together with r⋆, a valid digital
signature on c⋆‖mi. Since by assumption c
⋆ was never used to generate confirmer
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Experiment ExpSINV-CMA
CS,A
(1κ)
1. param ← CS.setup(1κ);
2. (pkS, skS)← CS.keygenS(1κ);
(pkC, skC)← CS.keygenC(1
κ);
3. (m⋆,I)←AS,Cv,V(find, pkS, pkC)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ CS.signskS (m, pkC)
Cv : (µ,m) 7−→ CS.convertskC (µ,m)
V : (µ,m) 7−→ CS.{sconfirm, confirm, deny}(µ,m)
4. µ⋆
1
← CS.signskS (m
⋆, pkC)
5. µ⋆
0
R
←− CS.space; b R←− {0, 1}
6. b⋆ ←AS,Cv,V(guess,I, µ⋆
b
, pkS, pkC)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ CS.sign{skS ,pkC}(m)
Cv : (µ,m)(, (µ⋆
b
,m⋆)) 7−→ CS.convertskC (µ,m)
V : (µ,m)(, (µ⋆
b
,m⋆)) 7−→ CS.{sconfirm, confirm, deny}(µ,m)
7. If (b = b⋆) return 1 else return 0.
Figure 4: Strong invisibility in confirmer signatures
signatures on the queried messages, R never invoked her own challenger for a digital
signature on c⋆‖mi. Therefore, (s
⋆, r⋆) will form a valid existential forgery on the
underlying digital signature scheme.
In the rest of this subsection, we show that the new StE paradigm achieves
a stronger notion (than INV-CMA) of invisibility that we denote SINV-CMA.
This notion was first introduced in [47], and it captures the difficulty to distin-
guish confirmer signatures on an adversarially chosen message from random
elements in the confirmer signature space. Again, the difference with the pre-
viously mentioned notions lies in the challenge phase where the SINV-CMA
attacker outputs a message m⋆ and receives in return an element µ⋆ which is
either a confirmer signature onm⋆ or a random element from the confirmer sig-
nature space. There is again the natural restriction of not querying the challenge
pair to the sconfirm, {confirm, deny}, and convert oracles. Similarly, a CDCS
scheme is (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-SINV-CMA secure if no adversary operating in time t,
issuing qs queries to the signing oracle (followed potentially by queries to the
sconfirm oracle), qv queries to the confirmation/denial oracles and qsc queries
to the selective conversion oracle that wins the game defined in Experiment
ExpSINV-CMA(1κ) (in Figure 5.2.1) with advantage greater that ǫ. The probability
is taken over all the coin tosses.
Theorem 5.4 Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈N
4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction proposed
above is (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-SINV-CMA secure if it uses a (t, ǫ
′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure
digital signature, an (t, ǫ”)-INV-OT secure DEM with injective encryption, and a
(t + qs(qv + qsc), ǫ · (1 − ǫ”) · (1 − ǫ
′)qv+qsc)-IND-CPA secure KEM.
Proof LetA be an attacker that (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-SINV-CMAbreaks our construc-
tion. We construct an algorithm R that breaks the underlying KEM as follows.
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[keygen] R gets the parameters of the KEM K from her challenger. Then,
she chooses an appropriate (t, ǫ”)-INV-OT secure DEM D together with
a (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure signature scheme Σ. R further generates a
key pair (Σ.sk,Σ.pk) for Σ and sets it as the signer’s key pair.
[sign and sconfirm queries] For a signature query, R proceeds like the stan-
dard algorithm. She furthermaintains a listL of the encapsulations c and
keys k used to generate the confirmer signatures.
[{confirm, deny} queries] For a verification query on a signature µ = (c, e, r)
and a message m, R looks up the list L for the decapsulation of c, which
once found, allows R to check the validity of the signature and therefore
simulate correctly the suitable protocol (confirmation or denial). If c has
not been used to generate confirmer signatures, thenRwill run the denial
protocol. Note that R is able to perfectly simulate to confirmation/denial
protocol since these are by definition concurrent zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge.
This simulation differs from the real onewhen the signature µ = (c, e, r) on
m is valid, but c does not appear in any record of L. We distinguish two
cases: eithermwas never queried to the signing oracle, then (m, µ) would
correspond to an existential forgery on the confirmer signature (and thus
to an existential forgery on Σ), or m has been previously queried to the
signing oracle in which case (m, µ) would correspond to an existential
forgery on Σ thanks to Remark 5.1. Hence, the probability that both
scenarios do not happen is at least (1 − ǫ′)qv (Σ is (t, ǫ′, qs)-SEUF-CMA
secure).
[convertqueries]Conversion queries are treated like verification querieswith
the exception of converting the signature instead of running confirm, and
issuing ⊥ instead of running deny. Similarly, this simulation does not
differ from the real execution of the algorithm with probability at least
(1 − ǫ′)qsc .
[Challenge] Eventually,A outputs a challenge message m⋆. R uses her chal-
lenge (c⋆, k⋆) to compute a digital signature (s⋆, r⋆) on c⋆‖m⋆. Then,
she encrypts s⋆ in e⋆ using D.encryptk⋆ and outputs µ
⋆ = (c⋆, e⋆, r⋆) to
A. Therefore, µ⋆ is either a valid confirmer signature on m⋆ or an ele-
ment indistinguishable from a random element in the confirmer signature
space (k⋆ is random andD is INV-OT secure, moreover r⋆ is information-
theoretically independent from m and Σ.pk). If µ⋆, in the latter case, is
a random element in the confirmer signature space, then this complies
with the scenario of a real attack. Otherwise, if µ⋆ is only indistinguishable
from random, then if the advantage of A is non-negligibly different from
the advantage of an invisibility adversary in a real attack, thenA can be
easily used to (t, ǫ′′)-INV-OT break D. To sum up, under the INV-OT
assumption of D, the challenge confirmer signature µ⋆ is either a valid
confirmer signature onm⋆ or a randomelement in the confirmer signature
space.
[Post challenge phase] A will continue issuing queries to the previous ora-
cles, and R can answer as previously. Note that in this phase, A might
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request the verification or conversion of a confirmer signature (c⋆,−,−) on
a message mi , m
⋆. According to the previous analysis, such a signature
is invalid w.r.t. mi with probability (1 − ǫ
′)qsc+qv .
In case the verification/conversion query involves m⋆ and c⋆, then let
(c⋆, e˜, r˜) , µ⋆ be the queried signature. We have (e˜, r˜) , (e⋆, r⋆). Two cases
manifest. Either r⋆ = r˜, inwhich case (c⋆, e˜, r˜) is invalidw.r.t. m⋆ since oth-
erwise e⋆ and e˜will be two different ciphertexts that decrypt to s⋆, which
is impossible sinceD is by assumption a DEM with injective encryption.
Or r⋆ , r˜; therefore for (c⋆, e˜, r˜) to be valid w.r.t. m⋆, (D.decrypt(e˜), r˜)
(, (s⋆, r⋆)) must be a valid digital signature on c⋆‖m⋆. Therefore, this
latter scenario does not happen with probability at least (1− ǫ′) since Σ is
SEUF-CMA secure.
Bottom line is, whenever a verification/conversion query involves c⋆ or
an encapsulation c that is not in the listL, Rwill issue the denial protocol
in case of a verification query, or the symbol ⊥ in case of a conversion
query. The probability that the simulation does not differ from the real
execution is at least (1 − ǫ′)qsc+qv .
[Final output] When A outputs his answer b ∈ {0, 1}, R will forward this
answer to her own challenger. ThereforeRwill (t+ qs(qv + qsc), ǫ · (1− ǫ”) ·
(1 − ǫ′)qv+qsc)-IND-CPA breakK .
5.3 An efficient variant of CtEaS
We remediate to the strong forgeability problem of CtEaS by using the same
trick applied to StE, namely bind the useddigital signature to the corresponding
confirmer signature. This is achieved by producing a digital signature on both
the commitment and the encryption of the random string used to generate it.
In this way, the attack discussed in Subsection 4.1 no longer applies, since an
adversary will need to produce a digital signature on the commitment and the
re-encryption of the random string used in it. Note that such a fix already
appears in the construction of [49], however, it was not exploitable as the
invisibility was considered in the insider model.
5.3.1 Commit then Encrypt then Sign: CtEtS
Let Σ be a signature scheme given by Σ.keygen, that generates (Σ.pk,Σ.sk),
Σ.sign, and Σ.verify. Let further Γ denote an encryption scheme given by
Γ.keygen, that generates (Γ.pk, Γ.sk), Γ.encrypt, and Γ.decrypt. Finally let Ω
denote a commitment scheme given byΩ.commit andΩ.open. We assume that
Γ produces ciphertexts of length exactly a certain κ. As a result, the first bit
of c will always be at the (κ + 1)-th position in e‖c, where e is an encryption
produced by Γ. The construction from the CtEtS paradigm is as follows.
Key generation (keygen). The signer’s key pair is (Σ.pk,Σ.sk) and the con-
firmer’s key pair is (Γ.pk, Γ.sk).
Signature (sign). To sign a message m, first produce a commitment c on m
using a random string r, encrypt this string in e, and then produce a digital
signature σ = Σ.signΣ.sk(e‖c). The confirmer signature onm is µ = (c, e, σ).
39
Verification ({sconfirm, confirm, deny}). To verify a signature on a givenmes-
sage, the prover (either the signer or the confirmer) provides a concurrent
zero-knowledge proof of the underlying (NP) statement.
Selective conversion (convert). Conversion of a valid signature µ = (c, e, σ)
is done by decrypting e.
It is clear that this new construction looses the parallelism of the original
one, i.e. encryption and signature can no longer be carried out in parallel,
however, it has the advantage of resting on cheaper encryption as wewill show
in the following. Moreover, it still preserves the merit of the CtEaS paradigm,
namely possibility to instantiate with any digital signature scheme 3.
Theorem 5.5 Given (t, qs) ∈N
2 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction depicted above
is (t, ǫ · (1 − ǫ′)qs , qs)-EUF-CMA secure if it uses a (t, ǫ
′)-binding commitment and a
(t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA secure digital signature scheme.
Proof Let A be an EUF-CMA attacker against the construction. We construct
an EUF-CMA attacker R against the underlying digital signature scheme as
follows.
R gets the parameters of the digital signature from her attacker, and chooses
suitable encryption and commitment schemes. After she gets the confirmer’s
key pair from A, R can perfectly simulate signature queries using her own
challenger. At some point, A will output a forgery µ⋆ = (c⋆, e⋆, σ⋆) on some
message m⋆, which was never queried before for signature. By definition, σ⋆
is a valid digital signature on e⋆‖c⋆. Suppose there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ qs such
that e⋆‖c⋆ = ei‖ci where µi = (ci, ei, σi) was the output confirmer signature on
the query mi. Due to the special way the strings ei‖ci are created, this implies
(ei, ci) = (e
⋆, c⋆). With probability at least (1 − ǫ′), we have mi = m
⋆ (the
commitment is (t, ǫ′)-binding), which is a contradiction. Therefore, e⋆‖c⋆ was
not queried by R for a digital signature with probability at least (1 − ǫ′)qs . R
outputs to her challenger the EUF-CMA forgery σ⋆ and e⋆‖c⋆.
For the invisibility proof, we first need this lemma:
Lemma 5.6 LetΩ and Γ be a commitment and a public key encryption scheme respec-
tively. We consider the following game between an adversary A and his challenger
R:
1. R invokes the algorithms Γ.keygen(1κ) to generate (pk, sk), where κ is a security
parameter.
2. A outputs two messages m0 and m1 such that m0 , m1 to his challenger.
3. R generates two nonces r0 and r1 such that r0 , r1. Next, he chooses two
bits b, b′
R
←− {0, 1} uniformly at random. Finally, he outputs to A cb =
Ω.commit(mb, r1−b′) and eb′ = Γ.encryptpk(rb′).
3Practical realizations from the StE paradigm need to use digital signatures from a special class
that we specify in Definition 6.1
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4. A outputs a bit ba representing his guess of cb not being the commitment of mb
using the nonce Γ.decrypt(eb′). A wins the game if ba , b, and we define his
advantage
adv(A) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[b , ba] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the random tosses of bothA and R.
If Ω is injective, (t, ǫb)-binding, and (t, ǫh)-hiding, then adv(A) in the above game is
at most ǫh1−ǫb .
Proof Let ǫ be the advantage of A in the game above. We will construct an
adversary R which breaks the hiding property of the used commitment with
advantage ǫ · (1 − ǫb).
• R gets fromA the messages m0,m1, and forwards them to her own chal-
lenger.
• R receives from her challenger the commitment cb = Ω.commit(mb, r) for
some b
R
←− {0, 1} and some nonce r.
• R generates a nonce r′ and outputs toA cb and e = Γ.encryptpk(r
′).
• WhenA outputs a bit ba, R outputs to her challenger 1 − ba.
IfA canby somemeansget hold of r′ , thenhe can compute ci = Ω.commit(mi, r
′),
i = 0, 1. Since Ω is injective and binding, then cb , Ω.commit(mb, r
′) and
cb , Ω.commit(m1−b, r
′) respectively, i.e. cb < {c0, c1}. Thus, A will get no
information on the message underlying cb even if he manages to invert e.
We have by definition:
adv(R) = (1 − ǫb)
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[1 − ba = b] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣
= (1 − ǫb)
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[ba , b] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣
= ǫ · (1 − ǫb)
Remark 5.2 Note that the above lemma holds true regardless of the used encryption
Γ. For instance, it can be used with encryption schemes that do not require any kind of
security.
Theorem 5.7 Given (t, qs, qv, qsc) ∈N
4 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction depicted
above is (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qsc)-INV-CMA secure if it uses a (t, ǫ
′, qs)-SEUF-CMA secure
digital signature, an injective, (t, ǫb)-binding, and (t, ǫh)-hiding commitment, and a
(t+qs(qv+qsc),
1
2 (ǫ+
ǫh
1−ǫb
)(1− eh1−ǫb )·[(1−ǫb)·(1−ǫ
′)]qv+qsc )-IND-CPAsecure encryption
scheme.
Proof (Sketch)
Let Σ, Γ, and Ω be the signature, encryption, and commitment schemes
resp. underlying the construction. Let further R be the reduction using the
invisibility attackerA in order to break Γ.
R gets the public key of Γ from her challenger. She further generates the
parameters of Σ (for instance (Σ.sk,Σ.pk)) and of Ω.
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Pre-challenge phase. Simulation of sign and sconfirm queries is done as
dictated by the standard algorithm/protocol, with the exception of main-
taining a listL of the strings used to produce commitments on the queried
messages in addition to their encryptions.
For a verification (conversion) query, R looks up the listL for the decryp-
tion of the first component of the signature; if it is found, R simulates
the confirmation protocol (issues the converted signature in case of a con-
version query), otherwise she simulates the denial protocol (issues the
symbol⊥ in case of a conversion). The difference between this simulation
and the real execution of the algorithm manifests when a queried signa-
ture, say (ci, ei, σi), is valid, on the queriedmessagemi, but ei is not present
in the list. We distinguish two cases, either the underlying message mi
has been queried previously on not. In the latter case, such a signature
would correspond to an existential forgery on the construction, thus, to
an existential forgery on Σ or to breaking the binding property of Ω. In
the former case, let (c j, e j, σ j) be the output signature toA on the message
mi. We have ei‖ci , e j‖c j since ei , e j, and both ei and e j are the n-bit pre-
fixes of ei‖ci and e j‖c j resp. We conclude that the adversarywould have to
compute a digital signature on a string for which he had never obtained
a signature. Thus, the query would lead to an existential forgery on Σ.
Bottom line is, the probability that the provided simulation does not
deviate from the real execution is at least [(1 − ǫ′) · (1 − ǫb)]
qv+qsc .
Challenge phase. At some point, A outputs two messages m0,m1 to R. The
latter chooses two different random strings r0 and r1 and hands them
to her challenger. R receives then a ciphertext eb′ , encryption of rb′ , for
some b′ ∈ {0, 1}. To answer her challenger, R computes a commitment cb
on the message mb for some b
R
←− {0, 1} using the string rb, then outputs
µ = (cb, eb′ ,Σ.signΣ.sk(eb′‖cb)) as a challenge confirmer signature toA. Two
cases: either µ is a valid confirmer signature on mb (if b
′ = b), or it is not a
valid signature on either m0 or m1. A cannot tell the difference between
the provided challenge and that in a real attack with probability at least
1 − ǫh1−ǫb according to Lemma 5.6.
Post-challenge phase. A continues to issue queries and R continues to han-
dle them as before. Note that in this phase, R might get a verification
(conversion) query on a signature (cb, e
′
b
,−) , µ and the message mb. R
will respond to such a query by running the denial protocol (output ⊥).
This simulation differs from the real algorithm when (cb, e
′
b
,−) is valid
on mb. Again, such a scenario won’t happen with probability at least
[(1 − ǫ′) · (1 − ǫb)]
qv+qsc , because the query would form a strong existential
forgery on Σ.
Final output. Let ba be the bit output byA. R will output b to her challenger
in case b = ba and 1 − b otherwise.
TheadvantageofA in suchanattack isdefinedby ǫ = adv(A) =
∣∣∣Pr[ba = b|b′ = b] − 12 ∣∣∣.
We assume again without loss of generality that ǫ = Pr[ba = b|b
′ = b] − 12 .
The advantage of R is then given by the product psim · pchal, where psim is
the probability of providing a simulation indistinguishable from that in a real
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attack; it is equal to (1 − eh1−ǫb ) · [(1 − ǫb) · (1 − ǫ
′)]qv+qsc . Whereas pchal is the
probability that R solves her challenge provided the simulation is correct:
pchal =
[
Pr[b = ba, b
′ = b] + Pr[b , ba, b
′
, b] −
1
2
]
=
1
2
[Pr[b = ba|b
′ = b] + Pr[b , ba|b
′
, b] − 1]
=
1
2
[
(ǫ +
1
2
) + (
ǫh
1 − ǫb
+
1
2
) − 1
]
=
1
2
(ǫ +
ǫh
1 − ǫb
)
In fact, Pr[b′ , b] = Pr[b′ = b] = 12 as b
R
←− {0, 1}. Moreover, if b′ , b, then the
probability thatA answers 1−b is 12 greater than the advantage of the adversary
in the game defined in Lemma 5.6, namely ǫh1−ǫb .
6 Practical Realizations of CDCS
In this section, we provide practical realizations of confirmer signatures from
StE, CtEtS, and EtS. We first introduce some classes of basic primitives that
constitute important building blocks for the mentioned constructions. Then,
we proceed to the description of our concrete instantiations of the paradigms.
6.1 The class S of signatures
Definition 6.1 S is the set of all digital signatures for which there exists a pair of
efficient algorithms, convert and retrieve, where convert inputs a public key pk,
a message m, and a valid signature σ on m (according to pk) and outputs the pair (s, r)
such that:
1. r reveals no information about m nor about pk, i.e. there exists an algorithm
simulate such that for every public key pk from the key space and for every
message m from the message space, the output simulate(pk,m) is statistically
indistinguishable from r.
2. there exists an algorithm compute that on the input pk, the message m and r,
computes a description of a function f : (G, ∗)→ (H, ◦s):
• where (G, ∗) is a group and H is a set equipped with the binary operation
◦s ,
• ∀S, S′ ∈ G: f (S ∗ S′) = f (S) ◦s f (S
′).
and an I ∈H, such that f (s) = I.
and an algorithm retrieve that inputs pk, m and the correctly converted pair (s, r)
and retrieves4 the signature σ on m.
4Note that the retrieve algorithm suffices to ensure the non-triviality of themap f ; given a pair
(s, r) satisfying the conditions described in the definition, one can efficiently recover the original
signature on the message.
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Prover P Verifier V
Choose s′
R
←− G
Compute t1 = f (s
′)
t1
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b
R
←− {0, 1}
z = s′ ∗ sb
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify that f (z) = t1 ◦s I
b
Figure 5: Proof of membership to the language {s : f (s) = I} Common input: I
and Private input : s
The class S differs from the class C, introduced in [87], in the condition
required for the function f . In fact, in our description of S, the function f should
satisfy a homomorphic property, whereas in the class C, f should only possess
an efficient zero knowledge protocol for proving knowledge of a preimage
of a value in its range. We show in Theorem 6.1 that signatures in S accept
also efficient ZK proofs for proving knowledge of preimages, and thus belong
to the class C. Conversely, one can claim that signatures in C are also in
S, at least from a practical point of view, since it is not known in general
how to achieve efficient ZK protocols for proving knowledge of preimages
of f without having the latter item satisfy some homomorphic properties. It
is worth noting that similar to the classes S and C is the class of signatures
introduced in [55], where the condition of having an efficient ZK protocol
for proving knowledge of preimages is weakened to having only a witness
hiding proof of knowledge. Again, although this is a weaker assumption on
f , all illustrations of signatures in this wider class happen to be also in C and
S. Our resort to specify the homomorphic property on f will be justified later
whendescribing the confirmation/denial protocols of the resulting construction.
In fact, these protocols are concurrent composition of proofs and therefore
need a careful study as it is known that zero knowledge is not closed under
concurrent composition. Besides, the class S encompasses most proposals
that were suggested so far, e.g. [6, 84, 48, 12, 79, 32, 18, 19, 9, 95, 92]. The
reason why S includes most digital signature schemes lies in the fact that a
signature verification consists in applying a function f to the “vital” part of the
signature in question, then comparing the result to an expression computed
from the message underlying the signature, the “auxiliary” or “simulatable”
part of the signature, and finally the public parameters of the signature scheme.
The function f need not be one-way, however the signature scheme would be
trivially forgeable if it is not the case. Moreover, it ( f ) consists most of the
time of an arithmetic operation (e.g. exponentiation, raising to a power, pairing
computation) which satisfies an easy homomorphic property.
Theorem 6.1 The protocol depicted in Figure 5 is an efficient zero knowledge protocol
for proving knowledge of preimages of the function f described in Definition 6.1.
The proof is straightforward using the standard techniques.
44
Prover P Verifier V
Choose s′
R
←− G
Compute t2 = Γ.encrypt(s
′)
t2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b
R
←− {0, 1}
z = s′ ∗ sb
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ZKP{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦e eb)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if the proof ZKP is valid
Figure 6: Proof system of membership to the language {s : s = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(e)}
Common input: (e, Γ.pk) and Private input: s and Γ.sk or randomness encrypt-
ing s in e
6.2 The class E of encryption schemes
Definition 6.2 E is the set of public key encryption schemes Γ that have the following
properties:
1. The message space is a group M = (G, ∗) and the ciphertext space C is a set
equipped with a binary operation ◦e.
2. Let m ∈ M be a message and c its encryption with respect to a key pk. On the
common input m, c, and pk, there exists an efficient zero knowledge proof ZKP of
m being the decryption of c with respect to pk. The private input of the prover is
either the private key sk, corresponding to pk, or the randomness used to encrypt
m in c.
3. ∀m,m′ ∈ M, ∀pk :
Γ.encryptpk(m ∗m
′) = Γ.encryptpk(m) ◦e Γ.encryptpk(m
′)
Moreover, given the randomnesses used to encrypt m in Γ.encryptpk(m) and
m′ in Γ.encryptpk(m
′), one can deduce (using only the public parameters) the
randomness used to encrypt m ∗m′ in
Γ.encryptpk(m) ◦e Γ.encryptpk(m
′).
Examples of encryption schemes include for instance ElGamal’s encryption
[45], Paillier’s encryption [75], or the Boneh-Boyen-Shacham scheme [10]. In
fact, these schemes are homomorphic and possess an efficient proof of correct-
ness of a decryption, namely the proof of equality of two discrete logarithms
in case of [45, 10] and the proof of knowledge of an N-th root in case of [75].
Note that bothElGamal’s andBoneh-Boyen-Shacham’s encryptions arederived
from the KEM/DEMparadigm and are therefore suitable for use in the new StE
paradigm.
Theorem 6.2 Let Γ be an encryption scheme from the above class E. Let further c be
an encryption of some message m under some public key pk. The protocol depicted in
Figure 6 is a zero knowledge protocol for proving knowledge of the decryption of c.
Proof Completeness is straightforward.
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Validity (knowledge extractability) is also easy. In fact, suppose a malicious
prover P˜ can successfully answer two different challenges 0 and 1 (challenge
space is {0, 1}) for the same commitment value t2:
z1 = Γ.decrypt(t2) ∧ z2 = Γ.decrypt(t2 ◦e e)
Since ◦e induces a group law in the ciphertext space of Γ, we have: z
−1
1
=
Γ.decrypt(t−1
2
). It follows that P˜ can compute a decryption of e as z−1
1
∗ z2 =
Γ.decrypt(e). We conclude that the soundness error probability of the protocol
is at most 1/2 (we assume that ZKP has negligible soundness error). We will
see in Subsection 6.7 how to reduce the soundness error without necessarily
repeating the protocol many times.
For the zero-knowledgeness, we describe the following simulator:
1. Generate uniformly a random challenge b′
R
←− {0, 1}. Choose a random
z
R
←− G, compute t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(z) ◦e e
−b′ and sends it to the verifier.
2. Get b from the verifier.
3. If b = b′, the simulator sends back z and simulates the proof ZKP for z
being the decryption of t2 ◦e e
b (this proof is simulatable since it is zero
knowledge by assumption). Otherwise, it goes to Step 2 (rewinds the
verifier).
The prover’s first message is always an encryption of a random value, and
so is the first message of the simulator. Since b′ is chosen uniformly at random
from {0, 1}, then, the probability that the simulator does not rewind the verifier
is 1/2, and thus the simulator runs in polynomial time in the security parameter.
Finally, the distribution of the answers (last messages) of the prover and of the
simulator is the same. We conclude that the proof is perfectly zero knowledge.
6.3 The class C of commitments
Definition 6.3 C is the set of all commitment schemes for which there exists an algo-
rithm compute that inputs the commitment key pk, themessagem and the commitment
c on m, and computes a description of a map f : (G, ∗)→ (H, ◦c) where:
• (G, ∗) is a group andH is a set equipped with the binary operation ◦c ,
• ∀r, r′ ∈ G: f (r ∗ r′) = f (r) ◦c f (r
′).
and an I ∈H, such that f (r) = I, where r is the opening value of c w.r.t. m.
It is easy to check that Pedersen’s commitment scheme is in this class.
Actually, most commitment schemes have this built-in property because it is
often the case that the committer wants to prove efficiently that a commitment
is produced on somemessage. This is possible if the function f is homomorphic
as shown in Figure 7.
Theorem 6.3 The protocol depicted in Figure 7 is an efficient zero knowledge protocol
for proving knowledge of preimages of the function f described in Definition 6.3.
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Prover P Verifier V
Compute I as defined in Definition 6.3 Compute I as defined in Definition 6.3
Choose r′
R
←− G
Compute t1 = f (r
′)
t1
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b
R
←− {0, 1}
z = r′ ∗ rb
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify that f (z) = t1 ◦c I
b
Figure 7: Proof of membership to the language {r : c = commit(m, r)}
Common input: (c,m) and Private input : r.
Prover P Verifier V
Compute I as indicated in Definition 6.1 Compute I as indicated in Definition 6.1
Choose s′
R
←− G
Compute t1 = f (s
′)
Compute t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(s
′)
t1, t2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b
R
←− {0, 1}
z = s′ ∗ sb
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ZKP{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦e (c, e)b)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if the proof ZKP is valid and,
f (z) = t1 ◦s I
b in case of confirmation,
f (z) , t1 ◦s I
b in case of denial.
Figure 8: Confirmation/Denial protocol for the new StE.
PoK{s : s = Γ.decrypt(c, e) ∧ Σ.verify(retrieve(s, r),m‖c) = (,)1}
Common input: (c, e, r,Σ.pk, Γ.pk) and Private input: Γ.sk or randomness
encrypting s in (c, e)
6.4 Practical realizations from StE
We combine a secure signature scheme Σ ∈ S and a secure encryption scheme
Γ ∈ E, which is derived from the KEM/DEM paradigm, in the way described in
Subsection 5.2. Namely we first compute an encapsulation c together with its
corresponding key k. Then we compute a signature σ on c concatenated with
the message to be signed. Finally convert σ to (s, r) using the convert algo-
rithm described in Definition 6.1 and encrypt s in e = D.encryptk(s) using k.
The resulting confirmer signature is (c, e, r). We describe in Figure 8 the confir-
mation/denial protocols corresponding to the resulting construction. Note that
the confirmation protocol can be also run by the signer who wishes to confirm
the validity of a just generated confirmer signature using the randomness used
to generate it.
Theorem 6.4 Let Σ and Γ be signature and encryption schemes from the classes S and
E resp. The confirmation protocol (run by either the signer on a just generated signature
or by the confirmer on any signature) described in Figure 8 is a zero knowledge proof
of knowledge.
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Proof The confirmation protocol in Figure 8 is a parallel composition of the
proofs depicted in Figures 5 and 6. Therefore completeness and soundness
(knowledge extractability) follow from the completeness and soundness of the
underlying proofs (see [51]). Finally, the ZK simulator is the parallel composi-
tion of the ZK simulators for the mentioned protocols.
Theorem 6.5 The denial protocol described in Figure 8, for Σ ∈ S and Γ ∈ E, is a
proof of knowledge with computational zero knowledge if Γ is IND-CPA-secure.
Proof Using the standard techniques, we prove that the denial protocol de-
picted in Figure 8 is complete and sound. Similarly, we provide the following
simulator to prove the ZK property.
1. Generate b′ ∈R {0, 1}. Choose z ∈R G and a random t1 ∈R f (G) and
t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(z) ◦e (c, e)
−b′ .
2. Get b from the verifier. If b = b′, it sends z and simulates the proof ZKP of
z being the decryption of t2 ◦e (e, sk)
b. If b , b′, it goes to Step 1.
The prover’s first message is an encryption of a random value s′ ∈R G, in
addition to f (s′). The simulator’s first message is an encryption of a random
value z∗s−b
′
and the element t1 ∈R f (G), which is independent of z. Distinguishing
those two cases is at least as hard as breaking the IND-CPA security of the
underlying encryption scheme. Therefore, under the IND-CPA security of the
encryption scheme, the simulator’s and prover’s first message distributions are
indistinguishable. Moreover, the simulator runs in expected polynomial time,
since the number of rewinds is 2. Finally, the distributions of the prover’s and
the simulator’s messages in the last round are again, by the same argument,
indistinguishable under the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme.
Concurrent Zero knowledgeness If the proof ZKP underlying the above pro-
tocols is a public-coin Honest-Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK) protocol, then
there are a number of efficient transformations that turns the above confir-
mation/denial protocols into proofs that are concurrent zero knowledge, e.g.
[72]. For instance, if ZKP is a Sigma protocol, then the aforementioned con-
firmation/denial protocols can be efficiently turned into concurrent ZK proofs
according to [35]; this transformation preserves the number of rounds while
it incurs a tiny overhead in the computational complexity (computation of a
commitment on a message). Note that although the transformation [35] is in
the auxiliary string model, such a scenario is easy to achieve in a public-key
setting; for example certificates computed by a PKI on public keys are possible
candidates to auxiliary strings to the players.
Performance of the new StE Our variant of StE improves the plain paradigm
[20] as it weakens the assumption on the underlying encryption from IND-
CCA to IND-CPA. This impacts positively the efficiency of the construction
from many sides. In fact, the resulting signature is shorter and its genera-
tion/verification cost is smaller. An illustration is given by ElGamal’s encryp-
tion and its IND-CCA variant, namely Cramer-Shoup’s encryption where the
ciphertexts are at least twice longer than ElGamal’s ciphertexts. Also, there is a
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multiplicative factor of at least two in favor of ElGamal’s encryption/decryption
cost. Moreover, the confirmation/denial protocols are rendered more efficient
by allowing homomorphic encryption schemes as shown earlier in this sub-
section, e.g. [45, 10] 5. Such encryption schemes were not possible to use
before since a homomorphic scheme can never attain the IND-CCA security.
Besides, even when the IND-CCA encryption scheme is decryption verifiable,
e.g. Cramer-Shoup, the involvedprotocols aremuchmore expensive than those
corresponding to their IND-CPA variant.
The construction achieves also better performances than the proposal of [55],
where the confirmer signature comprises k commitments and 2k IND-CCA
encryptions, where k is the number of rounds used in the confirmation protocol.
Moreover, the denial protocol presented in [55] suffers the resort to proofs of
general NP statements (where the considered encryption is IND-CCA). The
same remark applies to the construction of [93] where both the confirmation
and denial protocols rely on proofs of general NP statements.
Finally, we remark that our new StE, first introduced in [39], captures many
efficient realizations of confirmer/undeniable signatures, e.g. [64, 85]. It also
serves for analyzing some early schemes that had a speculative security: the
Damgård-Pedersen [34] undeniable signatures. In fact, we showed in Subsec-
tion 4.4, that these signatures are unlikely to be invisible, andwe proposed a fix
so that they meet the required security notion; interestingly, this repair turns
out to be a special instantiation of the new StE paradigm. Actually, even the
confirmation/denial protocols provided in [34] happen to be a special case of
the confirmation/denial protocols depicted in Figure 8.
6.5 Practical realizations from CtEtS
TheCtEtS has themerit of supporting anydigital signature scheme as a building
block. In fact, efficient as the StE paradigm is, it still applies only to a restricted
class of signatures. For instance, StE does not seem to be plausible with the PSS
signature scheme [6].
CtEtS does not involve a proof of knowledge of a signature in its confirma-
tion/denial protocols. In fact, confirmation (denial) of a signature on a certain
message consists in proving knowledge of the decryption of a given ciphertext,
and that this decryption is (is not) the opening value of a given commitment on
the message in question. More specifically, the confirmation/denial protocols
for CtEtS, when the encryption Γ belongs to the class E and the commitment Ω
belongs to the class C, are depicted in Figure 9.
Theorem 6.6 LetΩ and Γ be commitment and encryption schemes from the classes C
and E resp. The confirmation protocol depicted in Figure 9 is a zero knowledge proof
of knowledge.
Theorem 6.7 The denial protocol depicted in Figure 9, for Ω ∈ C and Γ ∈ E, is a
proof of knowledge with computational zero knowledge if Γ is IND-CPA-secure.
The proofs are similar to those of Theorem 6.4 and Theorem 6.5 respectively.
Similar to the new StE paradigm, our new CtEtS achieves better performances
5Both schemes are IND-CPA secure and are derived from the KEM/DEM paradigm. Moreover,
the underlyingKEMandDEMpresent interesting homomorphic properties thatmake them belong
the class E of encryption schemes. We refer to the discussion after Definition 6.2 for the details
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Prover P Verifier V
Compute I as defined in Definition 6.3 Compute I as defined in Definition 6.3
Choose r′
R
←− G
Compute t1 = f (r
′)
Compute t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(r
′)
t1, t2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b
R
←− {0, 1}
z = r′ ∗ rb
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ZKP{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦e eb)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if ZKP is valid and,
f (z) = t1 ◦c I
b in case of confirmation,
f (z) , t1 ◦c I
b in case of denial.
Figure 9: Confirmation/Denial protocol for the newCtEtSparadigm. PoK{r : r =
Γ.decrypt(e) ∧ c = (,)Ω.commit(m, r)} Common input: (e, c,m, Γ.pk,Ω.pk) and
Private input: Γ.sk or randomness encrypting r in e.
than the original technique (short signature, small generation, verification, and
conversion cost) while applying to any signature scheme. Moreover, it accepts
many efficient instantiations (if the used commitment and encryption belong
to the alreadymentioned classes) as its confirmation/denial protocols no longer
relies on general proofs of NP statements.
6.6 The EtS paradigm
EtS can be seen as a special instance of CtEtS since IND-CPA encryption can
be easily used to get statistically binding and computationally hiding commit-
ments. Therefore, one can first commit to the message to be signed using the
the encryption scheme, then sign the resulting ciphertext. The confirmer signa-
ture is composed of the ciphertext and of its signature. In fact, there will be no
need to encrypt the string used to produce the ciphertext (commitment) since
the private key of the encryption scheme is sufficient to check the validity of
a ciphertext w.r.t. a given message. Finally, selective conversion is achieved
by releasing a Non-Interactive ZK (NIZK) proof that the ciphertext (first part
of the confirmer signature) decrypts to the message in question. Note that in
this paradigm, the setting should include a trusted authority that generates the
common reference string (CRS); again, this is plausible in a public key setting
as PKIs can successfully play this role.
Similar to CtEtS, unforgeability of EtS rests on the unforgeability of the under-
lying signature, whereas invisibility rests on the strong unforgeability (SEUF-
CMA) of the signature and on the indistinguishability (IND-CPA) of the en-
cryption. We discuss in the rest of this subsection how to achieve practical
realizations from this technique.
6.6.1 Confirmation/denial protocols
Confirmation in EtS amounts to a proof of correctness of a decryption (i.e.
a given ciphertext encrypts a given message). This is in general easy since in
most encryption schemes, one candefine, givena ciphertext c and its underlying
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Prover P Verifier V
Choose m′
R
←− G
Compute t1 = f (m
′)
Compute t2 = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(m
′)
t1, t2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Choose b
R
←− {0, 1}
z = m′ ∗ m˜b
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ZKP{z = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(t2 ◦ cb)}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if ZKP is valid and f (z) , t1 ◦ f (m)b.
Figure 10: Denial protocol in EtS. PoK{m˜ : m˜ = Γ.decrypt(c)∧ m˜ , m} Common
input: (m, c, Γ.pk) and Private input: m˜ and Γ.sk or randomness encrypting m˜
in c
plaintext m, two homomorphic one-way maps f and g, and two quantities I
and J such that f (r) = I and g(sk) = J, where r is the randomness used to encrypt
m in c, and sk is the private key of the encryption scheme. Examples of such
encryptions include [45, 10, 75, 33, 21]. The confirmation protocol in this case
will be reduced to a proof of knowledge of a preimage of J (I) by the function g
( f ), for which we provided an efficient proof in Figure 5.
Concerning the denial protocol, it is not always straightforward. In most
discrete-logarithm-based encryptions, this protocol amounts to a proof of in-
equality of discrete logarithms as in [45, 10, 33]. In case the encryption scheme
belongs to the class E defined earlier, Figure 10 provides an efficient proof that
c encrypts some m˜ which is different from m. In the protocol provided in this
figure, f denotes an arbitrary homomorphicmap:
f (m ∗m′) = f (m) ◦ f (m′)
Similarly, the abovedenial protocol canbe shown to be a proof of knowledge
with computational ZK, if Γ is IND-CPA secure.
6.6.2 Selective conversion
Selective conversion in confirmer signatures from EtS consists in providing the
non-interactive variant of the confirmation protocol. We note in this paragraph
few solutions to achieve this goal:
The case of fully decryptable encryption schemes I.e. encryption schemes where
decryption leads to the randomness used to produce the ciphertext. In
this case, selective conversion can simply be achieved by releasing the
randomness used to generate the ciphertext. Examples of encryption
schemes from this class include [75]’s encryption: the scheme operates on
messages in ZN, where N = pq is a safe RSA modulus. Encryption of a
messagem is done by picking a random r ∈R Z
×
N and then computing the
ciphertext c = rN(1+mN) mod N2. Decryption of a ciphertext c is done by
raising it to λ = lcm(p− 1, q− 1) to findm. It is easy to see that recovering
r, once m is computed, amounts to an extraction of the N-th root of c1+mN .
Damgård et al. [36]’s solution. This solution transforms a 3-move interactive ZK
protocol P with linear answer to a non-interactive ZK one (NIZK) using
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a homomorphic encryption scheme in a registered key model, i.e. in a
modelwhere the verifier registers his key. The authors in [36] proposed an
efficient illustration using Paillier’s encryption and the proof of equality
of two discrete logarithms. We conclude that with such a technique,
EtS accepts an efficient instantiation if the considered encryption allows
proving the correctness of a decryption using the proof of equality of two
discrete logarithms, e.g. [45, 10, 33].
Groth and Sahai [57]’s solution. This technique is applicable in general for
encryption schemeswhere the encryption/decryption algorithmsperform
only group or pairing (if bilinear groups are involved) operations on the
randomness or the private key resp.
Lindell [66]’s solution. This Fiat-Shamir like transform turns any Sigma proto-
col for a relationR into aNIZK proof for the associated language LR, in the
common reference string model (without any random oracle). The con-
crete computational complexity of the transform is slightly higher than
the original Fiat-Shamir transform.
6.7 Reducing the soundness error
The protocols presented earlier in this section consist of a proof of knowledge
of preimages, by some homomorphicmap, which incidentally satisfy a relation
efficiently provable via a zero knowledge proof ZKP.
In this subsection, we show how to reduce the soundness error of these
protocols without necessarily repeating them. We will focus on the part of the
protocol proving knowledge of the preimage; actually we assume ZKP has a
negligible soundness error since it can itself implement the optimizations we
propose if it is a proof of knowledge for group homomorphisms.
Let f : (G, ∗) → (H, ◦) be the homomorphic map underlying the proof of
knowledge. Let further I be the value for which we want to prove knowledge
of a preimage. We consider a challenge space C that satisfies, for some known
values ℓ ∈ Z and u ∈ G, the following [70]:
1. gcd(b1 − b2, ℓ) = 1 for all b1, b2 ∈ C (with b1 , b2),
2. f (u) = Iℓ.
Note that the above conditions are easily met in groups with known prime
order ℓ, i.e. discrete-log based groups.
The protocol below is an efficient zero knowledge proof of knowledge of a
preimage of I, if C is polynomially bounded.
Prover P Verifier V
Choose s′
R
←− G
Compute t = f (s′)
t
−−−−−−−−−−→
b
←−−−−−−−−−− Choose b
R
←− C ⊆N
z = s′ ∗ sb
−−−−−−−−−−→
Accept if f (z) = t ◦ Ib
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Completeness is straightforward.
For knowledge extractability, we consider two accepting transcripts for the
same commitment value t and different challenges b1, b2 (b2 ≥ b1). Let z1, z2 the
responses of the prover in the last round.
We have f (z1) = t ◦ I
b1 and f (z2) = t ◦ I
b2 . Therefore f (z−1
1
∗ z2) = I
b2−b1 .
We compute values x, y by the Extended EuclideanAlgorithm to get. xℓ+ y(b2−
b1) = 1. It follows that I = I
xℓIy(b2−b1). Thus I = f (ux ∗ (z−1
1
∗ z2)
y). In other words,
a preimage of I can be computed as ux ∗ (z−1
1
∗ z2)
y.
Finally, the ZK simulator is similar to that of the original protocol with the
exception of drawing the challenge b′, in the first stage of the protocol, from
C. The new probability of not rewinding the verifier is 1/|C|. Thus, C must be
polynomially bounded in order to guarantee a polynomial running time of the
simulator.
7 Verifiable Signcryption
7.1 Syntax and model
Averifiable signcryption scheme consists of the followingalgorithms/protocols:
Setup (setup(1κ)). This probabilistic algorithm inputs a security parameter κ,
and generates the public parameters param of the signcryption scheme.
Key generation (keygenU(1
κ, param),U ∈ {S,R}). This probabilistic algorithm
inputs the security parameter κ and the public parameters param, and
outputs a key pair (pkU, skU) for the system user U which is either the
sender S or the receiver R.
Signcryption (signcrypt(m, skS, pkS, pkR)). This probabilistic algorithm inputs
a messagem, the key pair (skS, pkS) of the sender, the public key pkR of the
receiver, and outputs the signcryption µ of the message m.
Proof of validity (proveValidity(µ, pkS, pkR)). This is an interactive protocol
between the receiver or the sender who has just generated a signcryption
µ on some message, and any verifier: the sender uses the randomness
used to create µ (as private input) and the receiver uses his private key
skR in order to convince the verifier that µ is a valid signcryption on some
message. The common input to both the prover and the verifier comprises
the signcryption µ, pkS, and pkR. At the end, the verifier either accepts or
rejects the proof.
Unsigncryption (unsigncrypt(µ, skR, pkR, pkS)). This is a deterministic algo-
rithm which inputs a putative signcryption µ on some message, the key
pair (skR, pkR) of the receiver, and the public key pkS of the sender, and
outputs either the message underlying µ or an error symbol ⊥.
Confirmation/Denial ({confirm, deny}(µ,m, pkR, pkS)). These are interactive
protocols between the receiver and any verifier; the receiver uses his pri-
vate key skR (as private input) to convince any verifier that a signcryption
µ on some message m is/is not valid. The common input comprises the
signcryption µ and the messagem, in addition to pkR and pkS. At the end,
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the verifier is either convinced of the validity/invalidity of µ w.r.t. m or
not.
Signature extraction (sigExtract(µ,m, skR, pkR, pkS)). This is an algorithm
which inputs a signcryption µ, a message m, the key pair (skR, pkR) of the
receiver, and the public key pkS of the sender, and outputs either an error
symbol ⊥ if µ is not a valid signcryption on m, or a string σ which is a
valid digital signature on m w.r.t pkS otherwise.
Signature verification (sigVerify(σ,m, pkS)). This is an algorithm for verify-
ing extracted signatures. It inputs the extracted signature σ, the message
m and pkS, and outputs either 0 or 1.
We require in a signcryption scheme correctness and soundness. Moreover,
the protocols proveValidity and {confirm, deny} must be complete, sound,
and non-transferable. The formal definitions of these notions are similar to the
confirmer signatures case (see Subsection 3.1 ), therefore we omit them here
due to page limitations.
Finally, we require in a signcryption scheme two further properties: un-
forgeability, which protects the sender’s authenticity from malicious insider ad-
versaries (i.e. the receiver), and indistinguishability, whichprotects the sender’s
privacy from outsider adversaries.
Definition 7.1 (Unforgeability) We consider a signcryption scheme SC given by
the algorithms/protocols defined earlier in this section. LetA be a PPTM. We consider
the random experiment depicted in Experiment Expeuf-cmaSC,A (1
κ).
Experiment Expeuf-cmaSC,A (1
κ)
1. param← SC.setup(1κ);
2. (pkS, skS)← SC.keygenS(1κ, param);
3. (pkR, skR)←A(pkS);
4. µ⋆ ←AS(pkS, pkR, skR);
S : m 7−→ SC.signcrypt{skS, pkS, pkR}(m)
5. return 1 if and only if :
- SC.unsigncrypt{skR ,pkR,pkS}[µ
⋆] = m⋆
- m⋆ was not queried to S
We define the success ofA via:
Succeuf-cmaSC,A (1
κ) = Pr
[
Expeuf-cmaSC,A (1
κ) = 1
]
.
Given (t, qs) ∈ N
2 and ε ∈ [0, 1],A is called a (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary against
SC if, running in time t and issuing qs queries to the SC.signcrypt oracle, A has
Succeuf-cmaSC,A (1
κ) ≥ ε. The scheme SC is said to be (t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA secure if no
(t, ε, qs)-EUF-CMA adversary against it exists.
Remark 7.1 Note thatA is not given theproveValidity, unsigncrypt, sigExtract,
and {confirm, deny} oracles. In fact, these oracles are useless for him as he has the
receiver’s private key skR at his disposal.
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Definition 7.2 (Indistinguishability (IND-CCA)) Let SC be a signcryption scheme,
and let A be a PPTM. We consider the random experiment for b
R
←− {0, 1} depicted in
Experiment Expind-cca-bSC,A (1
κ).
Experiment Expind-cca-b
SC,A
(1κ)
1. param ← SC.setup(1κ);
2. (skS, pkS)← SC.keygenS(1κ, param);
3. (skR, pkR)← SC.keygen(1κ, param);
4. (m⋆
0
,m⋆
1
,I)←AS,V,U,C(pkS, pkR);
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ SC.signcrypt{skS ,pkS ,pkR }(m)
V : µ 7−→ SC.proveValidity(µ, pkS, pkR)
U : µ 7−→ SC.unsigncryptskR ,pkR ,pkS (µ)
C : (µ,m) 7−→ SC.{confirm, deny}(µ,m, pkR, pkS)
P : (µ,m) 7−→ SC.sigExtract(µ,m, pkR, pkS)
5. µ⋆ ← SC.signcrypt{skS ,pkS ,pkR}(m
⋆
b
);
6. d←AS,V,U,C(I, µ⋆, pkS, pkC);∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ SC.signcrypt{skS ,pkS ,pkR }(m)
V : µ 7−→ SC.proveValidity(µ, pkS, pkR)
U : µ(, µ⋆) 7−→ SC.unsigncryptskR ,pkR ,pkS (µ)
C : (µ,m)(, (µ⋆,m⋆
i
), i = 0, 1) 7−→ SC.{confirm, deny}(µ,m)
P : (µ,m)(, (µ⋆,m⋆
i
), i = 0, 1) 7−→ SC.sigExtract(µ,m)
7. Return d;
We define the advantage ofA via:
Advind-ccaSC,A (1
κ) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [Expind−cca−bSC,A (1κ) = b] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe) ∈ N
6 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe)-
IND-CCA adversary against SC if, running in time t and issuing qs queries to
the signcrypt oracle, qv queries to the proveValidity oracle, qu queries to the
unsigncryptoracle, qcd queries to the {confirm, deny} oracle, and qe to thesigExtract
oracle,A has
Advind−ccaSC,A (1
κ) ≥ ε. The scheme SC is (t, ε, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe)-IND-CCA secure if no
(t, ε, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe)-IND-CCA adversary against it exists.
7.2 Classical constructions for verifiable signcryption
Let Σ be a digital signature scheme given by Σ.keygen which generates a key
pair (Σ.sk, Σ.pk), Σ.sign, and Σ.verify. Let furthermore Γ denote a public key
encryption scheme described by Γ.keygen that generates the key pair (Γ.sk,Γ.pk),
Γ.encrypt, and Γ.decrypt. Finally, letΩ be a commitment scheme given by the
algorithmsΩ.commit andΩ.open. The most popular paradigms used to devise
signcryption schemes from basic primitives are:
• The “sign-then-encrypt” (StE) paradigm [1, 69, 27]. Given a message m,
signcrypt first produces a signature σ on the message using Σ.sk, then
encrypts m‖σ under Γ.pk. The result forms the signcryption on m. To
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unsigncrypt, one first decrypts the signcryption using Γ.sk in m‖σ, then
checks the validity of σ, using Σ.pk, on m. Finally, sigExtract of a valid
signcryption µ = Γ.encrypt(m‖σ) on m outputs σ.
• The“encrypt-then-sign” (EtS) paradigm [1, 69]. Givenamessagem, signcrypt
produces an encryption e on m using Γ.pk, then produces a signature σ
on e using Σ.sk; the signcryption is the pair (e, σ). To unsigncrypt such a
signcryption, one first checks the validity of σw.r.t. e using Σ.pk, then de-
crypts eusing Γ.sk to getm. Finally, sigExtractoutputs a zero knowledge
non-interactive (NIZK) proof that m is the decryption of e; such a proof
is possible since the statement in question is in NP ([52] and [7]). This
paradigm naturally requires the presence of a trusted authority in order
to generate the common reference string needed for the NIZK proofs.
• The “commit-then-encrypt-and-sign” (CtEaS) paradigm [1]. This construc-
tion has the advantage of performing the signature and the encryption
in parallel in contrast to the previous sequential compositions. Given a
message m, one first produces a commitment c on it using some random
nonce r, then encrypts m‖r under Γ.pk, and produces a signature σ on c
using Σ.sk. The signcryption is the triple (e, c, σ). To unsigncrypt such a
signcryption, one first checks the validity of σ w.r.t. c, then decrypts e to
get m‖r, and finally checks the validity of the commitment c w.r.t (m, r).
sigExtract is achieved by releasing the decryption of e, namely m‖r.
Theproofsofwell (mal) formed-ness, namelyprove-Validity and {confirm, deny}
can be carried out since the languages in question are in NP and thus accept
zero knowledge proof systems [52].
7.3 Negative results for StE and CtEaS
Weproceed in this subsection aswe did in confirmer signatures. First, we prove
that OW-CCA andNM-CPA encryption are insufficient to yield IND-CCA con-
structions from StE or CtEaS. We first prove this result for key-preserving reduc-
tions, then we generalize it to arbitrary reductions assuming further properties
on the underlying encryption. Next, we rule out OW-CPA, IND-CPA, and OW-
PCA by remarking that ElGamal’s [45] encryption meets all those notions but
leads to a simple attack against IND-CCA, when employed in constructions
from StE or CtEaS.
Lemma 7.1 Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that converts an IND-
CCA adversary A against signcryptions from the StE (CtEaS) paradigm to a OW-
CCA adversary against the underlying encryption scheme. Then, there exists a meta-
reductionM that OW-CCA breaks the encryption scheme in question.
Lemma 7.2 Assume there exists a key-preserving reduction R that converts an IND-
CCA adversary A against signcryptions from the StE (CtEaS) paradigm to an NM-
CPA adversary against the underlying encryption scheme. Then, there exists a meta-
reductionM that NM-CPA breaks the encryption scheme in question.
The proofs are similar to those of Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 respectively.
We similarly generalize the previous results to arbitrary reductions as in Sub-
section 4.3 if the encryption scheme has a non-malleable key generator, which
56
informally means that OW-CCA (NM-CPA) breaking the encryption, w.r.t. a
public key pk, is no easier when given access to a decryption oracle w.r.t. any
key pk′ different from pk.
Moreover, we can rule out the OW-CPA, OW-PCA, and IND-CPA notions by
remarking that ElGamal’s encryption meets all those notions (under different
assumptions), but cannot be employed in StE and CtEaS as it is malleable. In
fact, the indistinguishability adversary can create a new signcryption (by re-
encrypting the ElGamal encryption) on the challenge message, and query it for
unsigncryption. The answer to such a query is sufficient to conclude.
In consequence of the above analysis, the used encryption scheme has to
satisfy at least IND-PCA security in order to lead to secure signcryption from
StE or CtEaS. This translates in expensive operations, especially if verifiability
is further required for the resulting signcryption.
7.4 Positive results for signcryption schemes
7.4.1 The new StE and CtEaS paradigms
Signcryptions from StE or CtEaS suffer the strong forgeability: given a sign-
cryption on some message, one can create another signcryption on the same
message without the sender’s help. To circumvent this problem, we can apply
the same techniques used previously in confirmer signatures, namely bind the
digital signature to its corresponding signcryption. This translates for CtEaS
in producing the digital signature on both the commitment and the encryp-
tion. Similarly to confirmer signatures, the new CtEaS looses the parallelism
of the original one, i.e. encryption and signature can no longer be carried out
in parallel, however it has the advantage of resting on cheap encryption com-
pared to the early one. The new StE uses similarly an encryption scheme from
the KEM-DEM paradigm, and the digital signature is produced on both the
encapsulation of the key (used later for encryption) and the message .
Unfortunately, verifiability turns out to be a hurdle in both StE and CtEaS
paradigms; the new (and old) StE paradigm encrypts the message to be sign-
crypted concatenated with a digital signature. As we are interested in proving
the validity of the produced signcryption, we need to exploit the homomorphic
properties of the signature and of the encryption schemes in order to provide
proofs of knowledge of the encrypted signature and message. As a conse-
quence, the used encryption and signature need to operate on elements from a
set with a known algebraic structure rather than on bit-strings. The same thing
applies to the new (and old) CtEaS paradigm as encryption is performed on
the concatenation of the message to be signcrypted and the opening value of
the commitment scheme.
This leaves uswith only the EtS paradigm to get efficient verifiable signcryp-
tion. In fact, the sender needs simply to prove knowledge of the decryption of
a given ciphertext. Also, the receiver has to prove that a message is/isn’t the de-
cryption of a given ciphertext. Such proofs are easy to carry out if one considers
the already mentioned class E. Moreover, sigExtract (similar to conversion
in confirmer signatures) can be made efficient for many encryption schemes
from the class E. Unfortunately, signcryptions from EtS are not anonymous,
i.e. disclose the identity of the sender (anyone can check the validity of the
digital signature on the ciphertext w.r.t. the sender’s public key).
57
To sum-up, EtS provides efficient verifiability but at the expense of the
sender’s anonymity. StE achieves better privacy but at the expense of verifia-
bility. It would be nice to have a technique that combines the merits of both
paradigms while avoiding their drawbacks. This is the main contribution in
the next paragraph.
7.4.2 A new paradigm for efficient verifiable signcryption
The core of the idea consists in first encrypting the message to be signcrypted
using a public key encryption scheme, then applying the new StE to the pro-
duced encryption. The result of this operation in addition to the encrypted
message form the new signcryption of the message in question. In other terms,
this technique can be seen as a merge between EtS and StE; thus we can term it
the ”encrypt-then-sign-then-encrypt” paradigm (EtStE).
Consider a signature scheme Σ, an encryption scheme Γ, and another en-
cryption (K ,D) derived from the KEM/DEM paradigm. On input the security
parameter κ, generate the parameters param of these schemes. Note that a
trusted authority is needed to generate the common reference strings for the
NIZK proofs. We assume that signatures issued with Σ can be written as (r, s),
where r reveals no information about the signed message nor about the public
signing key, and s represents the “significant” part of the signature. Signcryp-
tions from EtStE are as follows:
Key generation. Invoke the key generation algorithms of the building blocks
and set the sender’s key pair to (Σ.pk,Σ.sk), and the receiver’s key pair to
({Γ.pk,K .pk}, {Γ.sk,K .sk}).
Signcrypt. On a messagem, produce an encryption e = Γ.encryptΓ.pk(m) ofm.
Then fix a key k along with its encapsulation c usingK .encryptK .pk, pro-
duce a signature (r, s) on c‖e, and finally encrypt swith k usingD.encrypt.
The signcryption of m is the tuple (e, c,D.encryptk(s), r).
Prove Validity. Given a signcryption µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4) on a message m, the
prover proves knowledge of the decryption of µ1, and of the decryption of
(µ2, µ3), which together with µ4 forms a valid digital signature on µ2‖µ1.
The private input is either the randomness used to create µ or {Γ.sk,K .sk}.
Unsigncrypt. Onasigncryptiona (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4), computem = Γ.decryptΓ.sk(µ1)
and k = K .decapK .sk(µ2). Checkwhether (D.decryptk(µ3), µ4) is valid sig-
nature on µ2‖µ1; if yes then output m, otherwise output ⊥.
Confirm/Deny. On input a putative signcryption µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4) on a
message m, use the receiver’s private key to prove that m is/isn’t the
decryption of µ1, and prove knowledge of the decryption of (µ2, µ3),
which together with µ4 forms a valid/invalid digital signature on µ2‖µ1.
Signature extraction. On a valid signcryption µ = (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4) on amessage
m, output a NIZK proof that µ1 encrypts m, in addition to
(D.decryptK .decap(µ2)(µ3), µ4).
Signcryptions from EtStE meet the following strong indistinguishability
notion, which captures both the anonymity of the sender and the indistin-
guishability of the signcryptions. The notion informally denotes the difficulty
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to distinguish signcryptions on an adversarially chosen message from random
elements in the signcryption space.
Definition 7.3 (String Indistinguishability (SIND-CCA)) Let SC be a signcryp-
tion scheme, and letA be a PPTM. We consider the random experiment for b
R
←− {0, 1}
depicted in Experiment Expsind-cca-bSC,A (1
κ).
Experiment Expsind-cca-bSC,A (1
κ)
1. param ← SC.setup(1κ);
2. (skS, pkS)← SC.keygenS(1κ, param);
3. (skR, pkR)← SC.keygen(1κ, param);
4. (m⋆,I)←AS,V,U,C(pkS, pkR);∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ SC.signcrypt{skS ,pkS ,pkR }(m)
V : µ 7−→ SC.proveValidity(µ, pkS, pkR)
U : µ 7−→ SC.unsigncryptskR ,pkR ,pkS (µ)
C : (µ,m) 7−→ SC.{confirm, deny}(µ,m, pkR, pkS)
P : (µ,m) 7−→ SC.sigExtract(µ,m, pkR, pkS)
5. µ⋆
1
← SC.signcrypt{skS ,pkS ,pkR}(m
⋆);
6. µ⋆
0
R
←− SC.space; b R←− {0, 1}
7. d←AS,V,U,C(I, µ⋆
b
, pkS, pkC);∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
S : m 7−→ SC.signcrypt{skS ,pkS ,pkR }(m)
V : µ 7−→ SC.proveValidity(µ, pkS, pkR)
U : µ(, µ⋆) 7−→ SC.unsigncryptskR ,pkR ,pkS (µ)
C : (µ,m)(, (µ⋆,m⋆)) 7−→ SC.{confirm, deny}(µ,m)
P : (µ,m)(, (µ⋆,m⋆)) 7−→ SC.sigExtract(µ,m)
8. Return d;
We define the advantage ofA via:
Advsind-ccaSC,A (1
κ) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [Expsind−cca−bSC,A (1κ) = b] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Given (t, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe) ∈ N
6 and ε ∈ [0, 1], A is called a (t, ε, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe)-
SIND-CCA adversary against SC if, running in time t and issuing qs queries to
the signcrypt oracle, qv queries to the proveValidity oracle, qu queries to the
unsigncryptoracle, qcd queries to the {confirm, deny} oracle, and qe to thesigExtract
oracle,A has
Advsind−ccaSC,A (1
κ) ≥ ε. The scheme SC is (t, ε, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe)-SIND-CCA secure if no
(t, ε, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe)-SIND-CCA adversary against it exists.
Theorem 7.3 Given (t, qs) ∈ N
2 and ε ∈ [0, 1], the above construction is (t, ǫ, qs)-
EUF-CMA secure if the underlying digital signature scheme is (t, ǫ, qs)-EUF-CMA
secure.
Theorem 7.4 Given (t, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe) ∈ N
6 and (ε, ǫ′) ∈ [0, 1]2, the construction
proposed above is (t, ǫ, qs, qv, qu, qcd, qe)-SIND-CCA secure if it uses a (t, ǫs, qs)-SEUF-
CMA secure digital signature, a (t, ǫe)-INV-CPA secure encryption, a (t, ǫd)-INV-OT
secure DEM with injective encryption, and a (t + qs(qv + qu + qcd + qe), ǫ(1 − ǫe)(1 −
ǫd)(1 − ǫs)
qv+qcd+qu+qpv)-IND-CPA secure KEM.
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Proof (Sketch) From an SIND-CCA adversaryA against the construction, we
construct an algorithm R that IND-CPA break the KEM underlying the con-
struction. R gets the public parameters of the KEM from her challenger and
chooses further the remaining building blocks, i.e. the DEM, the signature,
and the encryption scheme. Simulation of A’s environment is done using the
key pairs of the used signature and encryption schemes, in addition to a list
in which R maintains the queries, their responses and the intermediate values
used to generate these responses.
Eventually, A outputs a challenge messages m. R will encrypt, in e, the
message m. Next, she produces a signature (s, r) on c‖e, where (c, k) is her
challenge. Finally, R encrypts s in eD using k, and outputs µ = (e, c, eD, r) as
a challenge signcryption. Since the used encryption is INV-CPA secure by
assumption, then information about m can only leak from (c, eD, r). If k is
the decapsulation of c, then µ is a valid signcryption of m, otherwise it is a
random element from the signcryption space due to the assumptions on the
used components (encryption scheme is INV-CPA, the DEM is INV-OT, and
finally r reveals no information about e nor about sender’s key). The rest
follows as in the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Instantiations The proveValidity and {confirm, deny} protocols comprise
the following sub-protocols:
1. Proving knowledge of the decryption of a ciphertext produced using the
encryption scheme Γ.
2. Proving that a message is/isn’t the decryption of a certain ciphertext pro-
duced using Γ.
3. Proving knowledge of the decryption of a ciphertext produced using
(K ,D), and that this decryption forms a valid/invalid digital signature,
issued using Σ, on some known string.
It is natural to instantiate the encryption Γ from the class E described in
Definition 6.2. With this choice, the first two sub-protocols can be efficiently
carried out as depicted in Figure 6 and Figure 9 respectively. Moreover, one
can consider encryptions from the classE that are derived from the KEM/DEM
paradigm, in addition to signatures from the class S described in Definition 6.1.
The last sub-protocol boils down then to the protocol depicted in Figure 8.
Finally, for the sigExtract algorithm, we refer to the solutions adopted in
confirmer signatures (described in Paragraph6.6.2) when it comes to producing
a NIZK proof of the correctness of a decryption.
7.5 Extension to multi-user signcryption
So far, we considered signcryption schemes in the two-user setting, i.e. a
single sender interacts with a single receiver. A signcryption scheme secure in
the two-user setting does not necessarily mean that it conserves this security
in the multi-user setting. In fact, the unforgeability adversary in the latter
mode is allowed to return a forgery on a message m⋆ that may have been
queried before but w.r.t. a receiver’s key different from the target receiver’s
key pk⋆R. Moreover, the indistinguishability adversary is allowed to ask the
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unsigncryption or (public) verification of the challenge w.r.t. any receiver’s key
except that of the target receiver. However many works [1, 69] have proposed
simple tweaks in order to derive multi-user security from two-user security.
These techniques apply also to our constructions in order to guarantee security
in the multi-user setting. For instance, the EtS paradigm in the multi-user
setting departs from that of the two-user setting in the following elements:
1. It considers a tag-based encryption scheme where the tag is set to the
public key of the sender pkS.
2. The digital signature is produced on the resulting ciphertext and on the
public key of the receiver.
Similarly, the EtStE paradigm in the multi-user setting deviates from that of
the two-user one as follows:
1. It considers a tag-based KEM where the tag is set to the public key of the
sender pkS.
2. The digital signature is produced on the resulting ciphertext and on the
public key of the receiver.
8 Security Enhancement
In this section, we present two efficient transforms that upgrade the secu-
rity in confirmer signatures/signcryption, i.e., allow to obtain online non-
transferability and insider invisibility/indistinguishability.
8.1 Online non-transferability
Online non-transferability as previously mentioned allows to avoid some at-
tacks in which the intended verifier, say V, interacts concurrently with the
genuine prover and a hidden malicious verifier V˜ such that this latter gets
convinced of the proven statement (validity or invalidity of a signature w.r.t. a
given message).
Oneway to circumvent this problemconsists in using designatedverifier proofs
[61]. In fact, these proofs can be conducted by both the prover and the verifier.
When a verifier receives such a proof, he will be convinced of the validity of the
underlying statement since he has not proved it himself. However, he cannot
convince a third party of the validity of the statement as he can himself perfectly
simulate the answers sent by the prover.
A generic construction of designated verifier proofs fromΣ protocols was given
in [87]. The idea consists in proving either the statement in question or prov-
ing knowledge of the verifier’s private key. This is achieved using proofs of
disjunctive knowledge if the proof of the statement in question and the proof of
knowledge of the verifier’s private key are both Σ protocols. We refer to [87]
for the details.
Getting back to our problem, our already mentioned confirmation/denial
protocols can be shown to be Sigma protocols if the proof ZKP in the last round
is non-interactive (this would necessitate the presence of a trusted authority).
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In this case, they can be efficiently transformed into designated verifier proofs,
providing therefore the required online non-transferability for the resulting
signatures.
8.2 Insider invisibility/indistinguishability
Insider invisibility/indistinguishability does not seem plausible without IND-
CCA encryption. In fact, the reduction should be able to answer any query
submitted by the adversary; this latter who can create, using his signing key,
valid queries (confirmer signatures or signcryptions) without the help of the
reduction. A suitable candidate for IND-CCA encryption that fits nicely within
our framework is encryption obtained from the Canetti-Halevi-Katz like trans-
formation [22, 63]. This encryption is obtained by combining a weakly se-
cure tag-based encryption (indistinguishable under selective-tag weak chosen-
ciphertext attacks or IND-st-wCCA) and a strongly unforgeable one-time signa-
ture; the combination enjoys the required IND-CCA security while proffering
good verifiablity properties (the weakly secure encryption ought to be homo-
morphic, e.g [23]).
Therefore, StE, EtS, CtEaS, or EtStE will be used as follows. First generate a
pair of public/private keys for the one-time signature. Then proceed as dictated
by the paradigms with the exception of producing the required encryption us-
ing an IND-st-wCCA tag-based encryption with the public key of the one-time
signature as a tag, and finally signing all the produced quantities (that form the
confirmer signature/signcryption) using the private key (and the signing algo-
rithm) of the one time signature. The new confirmer signature/signcryption is
increased by the verification key and the one-time signature, which amounts
to four group elements when using Boneh-Boyen’s one-time signature, how-
ever it enjoys a full insider invisibility while remaining efficiently verifiable.
Note also that the produced signature/signcryption remains secure even in the
presence of an insider invisibility/indistinguishability adversary who is only
restricted from querying the challenge for verification/decryption. This is def-
initely a stronger attack model than that adopted in general for the EtS/CtEaS
paradigm, e.g. in [49, 1].
9 Perspectives
In this paper,we studied the classical paradigmsused tobuildmanyopaque sig-
natures, that are StE, EtS, and CtEtS. We showed using an increasingly popular
tool, namelymeta-reductions, that StE and CtEaS require expensive encryption
in order to provide a reasonable security level for the resulting construction.
This is due to an intrinsic weakness in those paradigms which consists in the
possibility of obtaining the opaque signature without the help of the signer.
Next, we proposed some adjustments to these paradigms which circumvent
this weakness and allow to rest on cheap encryption without compromising
the security level of the result. We further gave many practical instantiations
of these paradigms which efficiently implement the verifiability feature in the
constructions, i.e. the possibility to prove the validity of the opaque signature.
Our analysis accepts many possible extensions. We note in the following
the most immediate ones:
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Verifiably encrypted signatures A verifiably encrypted signature (VES) al-
lows a signer to encrypt a signature under the public key of a trusted party (the
adjudicator), while maintaining public signature verifiability without interac-
tive proofs. Actually, verifiability is usually achieved by considering special
classes of signature/encryption schemes. For instance, the class of encryptions
includes schemes where any pair of message and corresponding ciphertext,
under a given key, satisfies a relation confined by some efficiently computed
map, say f . It is obvious that such encryption schemes cannot be NM-CPA nor
IND-CPA secure due to the map f which allows to efficiently check whether
a ciphertext encrypts a given message under some given key. To rule out
OW-CCA encryption, one could similarly consider a meta-reductionMwhich
forbids existence of key-preserving reductions from OW-CCA security of the
encryption to the opacity of the VES: M can ask the reduction for a VES on
an arbitrary message, say m, then queries the CCA oracle for the decryption of
this VES (it is possible to make this query as it is different from the challenge
ciphertext). The result of this query, along with m, forms a valid answer of the
opacity adversary. Again, the interpretation of these impossibility results is that
the opacity adversary can create VES without the help of the signer by simply
re-encrypting the extracted signatures. It would be interesting to envisage the
previously presented solutions in order to make the opacity in VES rest on the
CPA security of the underlying encryption.
Group signatures Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst
[26], allowmembers of a group to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the
whole group. However, to prevent abuses, the group is controlled by a group
manager that has the ability to open the group signature, i.e. to identify the
signer of a message. A generic construction of group signatures from the StE
paradigm [13] consists in encrypting the identity of the user in the public key
of the group manager, then providing a signature of knowledge (NIZK of the
plaintext underlying the encryption and on the SDH solution) of the message
to be signed. The used encryption scheme has to be CCA secure in order to
provide full anonymityof the group signature. There exists also aweaker notion
of anonymity (than the full anonymity), called selfless anonymity, where the
adversary does not have the signing key of the target users (similar to outsider
security in CDCS/signcryption). This suggests to carry out the same analysis
(provided earlier) in order to study the exact security needed for the encryption
scheme in order to derive fully/selfless anonymous group signatures. Note that
we gave in [44] a generic construction of fully anonymous group signatures
using IND-st-wCCA tag based encryption combinedwith strongly unforgeable
one-time signatures. Our construction, whichusesmany ideaspresented earlier
in this text, generalizes awell known group signature [56], and served as a basis
for a recent proposal by [50] of the same primitive which reduces the trust on
the group manager by distributing the opening procedure.
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